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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

would make compliance with the Rule easier when a small securities offering is involved. In addition, commentators have suggested that Rule 144
should be amended to allow investors to resell a larger volume of restricted
securities once the investor has assumed the risk of the investment. Enactment of these amendments would encourage issuers to take advantage of
the private placement exemption and lessen the restrictions imposed on
the resale of restricted securities without substantially sacrificing the confidence and protection of the investing public.
A. PETER GREGORY

Ill.
A.

RULE 10b-5

Purchaser-SellerRequirement

In 1975, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrugStores'

1421

U.S. 723 (1975). The Blue Chip decision reflects a reversal of the expansive and

flexible approach to Rule 10b-5 litigation which in the past afforded plaintiffs greater access
to federal courts to remedy securities fraud. See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court
Decisons Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. J. 891 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]; Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b)
Tree: The Cultivation of a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CoRP. L. 112 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as New Securities Law Perspective]. Prior to Blue Chip, lower courts that
had refused to strictly apply the purchaser-seller requirement cited as policy rationales the
broad remedial purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), the primacy of the
need to protect the investing public, and the flexible nature of the federal securities laws.
New Securities Law Perspective,supra at 121. In recent years, however, the trend has shifted
to a more conservative and restrictive approach to 10b-5 litigation. See e.g., Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, absent
deception, manipulation or nondisclosure, not actionable under 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (no 10b-5 action for negligent conduct); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchasers and sellers of securities
have standing to bring 10b-5 private actions).
These cases are consistent with other recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the
scope of protection that the federal securities laws provide the investing public. See, e.g.,
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offeror does not have standing to
sue under § 14(e), '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970)); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438 (1976) (standard of materiality in Rule 14a-9 action, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976),
requires substantial likelihood that reasonable shareholder would consider omitted fact significant in voting shares); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232
(1976) (limits liability under § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1970), to purchasers and sellers who
are beneficial owners of 10 percent of stock both before and after the transaction); Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (plaintiff must show irreparable injury to obtain
injunctive relief under § 13(d), '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970); United Hous. Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (definition of "securities" does not include shares of
cooperative housing project); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975) (no implied private right of action under Securities Investor Protection Act., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa (1970)). In these recent cases, the Supreme Court has focused primarily upon the
specific statutory language involved, the legislative history, the new found interrelationship
between the civil liability provisions of the securities laws, and the availability of alternative
state law remedies. See generally, Lowenfels, supra;New SecuritiesPerspective,supra at 132.
In the last three years the Supreme Court has "consistently decided in favor of the defendants
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reaffirmed the purchaser-seller requirement, or Birnbaum rule,' as a limitation on standing to sue under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ('34 Act) and Rule 10b-5.1 Consequently, plaintiffs must prove
that they actually purchased or sold securities in connection with the
alleged fraud.4 In the three years since Blue Chip, lower courts-have strugand has enunciated principles that may circumscribe the rights of plaintiffs under the federal
securities laws for many years to come." Lowenfels, supra at 892.
2 The rule that only a person who has been defrauded in connection with his own purchase or sale of securities has standing to sue in a private Rule 10b-5 action was announced
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). The Birnbaum rule had been criticized as an arbitrary restriction inconsistent with
the broad antifraud purposes of RIlle 10b-5. See, e.g., Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp.
490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972);
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine:A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv.
268 (1968). Prior to the Blue Chip decision several lower courts had modified or even rejected
the Birnbaum rule. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
3 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Although the Blue Chip Court recognized the legislative history and statutory analysis
provide less than conclusive guidance in determining the class of plaintiffs that has standing
under Rule 10b-5, the Court was persuaded that as a matter of policy, further dilution *or
rejection of the Birnbaum rule was undesirable. 421 U.S. at 730-49. Despite the arbitrary
character of the rule, the Court feared that abolition of the purchaser-seller requirement
would result in a proliferation of strike suits and vexatious litigation in which undeserving
plaintiffs would seek speculative damages. Id. at 740. Such litigation occurs when nonmeritorious suits cannot be disposed of without a trial. Id. The threat of extensive discovery and
litigation disrupting normal business operations creates a settlement value far out of proportion to the actual merit of the suit. See id. at 740-43. Furthermore, without the purchaserseller requirement, courts would have great difficult in accurately assessing injury to nonpurchasers and nonsellers. In the absence of a documented securities transaction, the role of oral
testimony would be crucial in such suits. Id. at 743. Reaffirmation of the purchaser-seller
requirement would, in the view of the Blue Chip Court: 1) provide the "objectively demonstrable fact," i.e., the purchase or sale of securities, that would obviate the dangers of suits based
upon uncorroborated oral testimony; 2) preclude bystanders to the securities markets from
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gled with the application of the purchaser-seller requirement to various
fact patterns and with the continued validity of various exceptions that
had evolved prior to Blue Chip.5 During the past year courts have continresorting to Rule 10b-5 as a check against poor investment decisions not to trade; and, 3)
avoid indeterminant liability since the number of shares and the price at which they were
traded are objective facts. Id. at 747. The Court reasoned that, on balance, the advantages
of a limited and identifiable plaintiffs' class and accurate assessment of actual damages
outweigh the disadvantages of denying a federal remedy to defrauded nonpurchasers and
nonsellers of securities. Id. at 738-39. See generally, Gallagher, lob-5 After Blue Chip: How
Stands The Judicial Oak?, 80 DicK. L. Rzv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gallagher]; Note,
Standing Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv. 413 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Standing Under Rule lob-5].
5 Prior to recent Supreme Court cases circumscribing the scope of federal securities laws,
lower courts were receptive to new and imaginative causes of action under Rule 10b-5 in an
attempt to effectuate what were perceived to be the broad antifraud and remedial purposes
of the rule. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973). However, the "repeated modification, circumvention, and outright rejetion of the Birnbaum rule by the lower courts clearly undermined
its force. . . ." Standing Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 4, at 414. The Court in Blue Chip
called for a straight-forward application of the Birnbaum rule to end the "case-by-case
erosion" of the purchaser-seller requirement. 421 U.S. at 755. Although the Blue Chip decision failed to clarify the status of each of the judicially created exceptions, clearly the Court
added a measure of rigidity to the purchaser-seller requirement. See Standing Under Rule
lob-5, supranote 4, at 428-30 (arguing that the Court intended to limit further expansion of
standing rather than cut back accepted exceptions); 1976-1977SecuritiesLaw Developments:
Rule l1b-5, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 882, 893 n.67 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1976-1977
Developments]. In general, lower courts have not applied the Blue Chip mandate rigorously;
some courts continue to cite the expansive language of pre-Blue Chip decisions when considering exceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement. See text accompanying notes 62-105
infra.
The five principal exceptions to the Birnbaum rule which had developed prior to Blue
Chip were the forced seller exception, the aborted transaction exception, the de facto seller
exception, the derivative action exception and the injunctive relief exception.
Courts have treated a nonselling plaintiff as a "forced seller" for the purpose of the
purchaser-seller requirement where his investment has been converted by defendant's fraud,
usually in connection with a short form merger or corporate liquidation, into a claim for
money. Since plaintiff has lost control over the disposition of his securities, requiring proof
of an actual sale as a prerequisite to standing would be a "needless formality." Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (fraudulently
executed short-form merger forced minority shareholders to sell at greatly reduced price or
retain stock in nonexistent company). Several post-Blue Chip decisions have recognized the
continuing validity of the forced seller exception. See note 75 infra. Two recent decisions have
cast doubt, however, on the availability of forced seller status to frustrated tender offerors.
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Crane v. American Std. Co., Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For differing viewpoints on the potential impact of Blue
Chip on the forced seller exception, compare Gallagher, supranote 4, at 36-37 with Standing
Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 4, at 431-37 and 1976-1977 Developments, supra at 893-97; see
text accompanying notes 63-78 infra.
Nonpurchasers and nonsellers who would have consummated a securities transaction but
for defendants' breach of contract or agreement to purchase or sell securities have standing
under the aborted transaction exception. See, e.g., Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, 290
F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The holder of contractual rights to purchase or sell securities
is, however, a purchaser or seller within the meaning of the '34 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§
78c(a)(13) & (14) (1970). The aborted transaction exception is not a true judicially created
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exception although courts and commentators have consistently used this terminology. Courts
since Blue Chip have taken a restrictive approach to the nature of the contractual rights
required to satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement. See text accompanying notes 9-61 infra.
The de facto seller exception has been applied where the real party in interest, i.e., the
party whose economic interests are harmed or benefitted by the transaction, is not the legal
titleholder of the securities at the time of the sale, and, therefore, is not the acutal seller.
See James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F.
Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Although several post-Blue Chip decisions have recognized the
continued vitality of the de facto seller exception, see Blackmar v. Lichenstien, 438 F. Supp.
803 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Klamberg v. Roth, 425 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); text accompanying notes 79-105
infra, commentators have split on whether the exception can be justified in light of Blue Chip.
Compare Gallagher, supra note 4, at 37-38 and Standing Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 4, at
430 n.104 with 1975-1976 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 33 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 935, 951 n.84 (1976) and Comment, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure
to Solve The Purchaser-SellerProblem, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 965, 993 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Failure to Solve]. See 1976-1977 Developments, supra this note, at 895-97 (criticizing
Klamberg decision).
Under the derivative action exception, shareholders who bring suit on behalf of a corporation meet the purchaser-seller requirement of Birnbaum where the corporation itself has
brought or sold securities. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). Although a variety of corporate transactions have been held to constitute a purchase or sale
under Rule 10b-5, see Failure to Solve, supra at 989-90, this exception has been widely
accepted by the courts. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Because the derivative
action exception requires a determination whether the corporation was a purchaser or seller,
the evidentiary considerations of Blue Chip are fulfilled. The exception has been acknowledged as consistent with the mandate of Blue Chip. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23,
31-32 (N.D. Il. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part with direction to modify, 560 F.2d 235
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978) (No. 77-814); Walner v.
Friedman, 410 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Prior to Blue Chip, a number of courts had applied the injunctive relief exception,
holding that the elements necessary to maintain an action to enjoin continuing or future
violations of Rule 10b-5 differ from those required to bring a suit for damages. See Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 348 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967). Status as a purchaser or seller has been held not to be a requisite for standing
when injunctive relief is sought. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 348 F.2d
540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967) (minority shareholders have standing although neither they nor
corporation were purchasers or sellers in allegedly fraudulent transaction).
The future of the injunctive relief exception after Blue Chip is in doubt. Although the
standing limitation announced in Blue Chip applied expressly to private actions for damages,
the policy concerns apply with some force to suits for injunctive relief. To the extent that an
injunctive action disrupts normal business operations and affects activities such as mergers
and acquisitions, such an action may contribute to the vexatious litigation feared in Blue
Chip. However, the principle objective of some strike suits, a disproportionate settlement
value, is not present where equitable relief is sought. Furthermore, actions for injunctive relief
are an effective means of preventing prospective securities fraud. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
524 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970).
Post Blue Chip decisions have recognized the continuing validity of the injunctive relief
exception. See Wright v. Heizer, 560 F.2d 236, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1976); Harriman v. E. I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del.
1975). Commentators, however, disagree on whether this exception can be justified in light
of Blue Chip. Compare Bauman, The Future of Rule 10b-5: A Comment on Jacobs, The
Impact of Rule 10b-5, 4 SEC. REG. L. J. 332, 338-39 (1976); Gallagher, supra note 4, at 39-41,
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ued the process of determining the nature of contractual rights to purchase
or sell securities, 6 the validity of judicially created exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule,7 and the meaning of the requirement that fraud challenged
in a Rule 10b-5 action be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities. 8
ContractualRights to Purchase or Sell Securities
The '34 Act expressly defines the terms "purchase" and "sale" to include any contract to purchase or sell securities Thus, a plaintiff alleging
fraud in connection with a contract to purchase or sell securities"0 satisfies
the purchaser-seller requirement. 1 Under the rubric of the "aborted transaction" exception 2 to the Birnbaum rule, courts have held that nonpurchasers and nonsellers who would have consummated securities transactions but for defendants' breach of contracts have standing to sue under
Rule 10b-5.13 A finding that plaintiffs whose contractual rights to purchase
or sell securities have been breached have standing is not, however, so
much an exception to the purchaser-seller requirement as it is an application of the statutory language conferring standing on the holders of such
rights. Within the past year, courts have examined whether plaintiffs having contract rights in oral stock-purchase orders, '"stock registration rights
provided in employment contracts, 5 and conversion rights in convertible
debentures' 6 are holders of contractual rights sufficient for such plaintiffs
to meet the purchaser-seller requirement.
In Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co.,' 7 the court considered whether a broker's
oral agreement to purchase securities for an investor constitutes a contract
and 1975-1976 Developments, supra, at 953-56 (injunctive relief exception cannot survive
Blue Chip) with Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stanps, 3 SEC. REG.
L. J. 387, 401-03 (1976); Standing Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 4, at 441-44 and Failureto
Solve, supra, at 986-87.
See text accompanying notes 9-61 infra.
See text accompanying notes 62-105 infra.
See text accompanying notes 106-137 infra.
The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire. '34 Act § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)(1970). The terms "sale" and
"sell" each include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." '34 Act § 3(a) (14), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(14)(1970).

1O
The requirement that the alleged fraud must have occurred "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of securities is discussed infra. See text accompanying notes 106-137 infra.
" See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1OB-5 § 38.02[b], at 2-67, 2-68 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A. JACOBS].
See note 5 supra.
See generally Standing Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 4, at 437-41; Comment, lOb-5
Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L. J. 1007, 101624 (1973).
" See text accompanying notes 17-24 infra.
* See text accompanying notes 25-39 infra.
* See text accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
11[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
1977).
12
"
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for the purpose of the purchaser-seller requirement. Plaintiff placed a
stock-purchase order by telephone with the defendant brokerage firm. The
broker never purchased the stock and the defendants allegedly misrepresented their intention to execute the purchase order.'" The defendants
argued that since the contract asserted as the basis of standing was oral,
the lack of documentary corroboration raised the same policy considerations which undergirded the Blue Chip decision.'9 In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court expressed concern that allowing plaintiffs to base Rule 10b-5
suits on uncorroborated oral testimony would increase the likelihood of
vexatious litigation since defendants could not rebut such testimony and
any damages assessed would be speculative."
The court in Horst noted that in Blue Chip the Supreme Court relied
upon policy considerations because the legislative history of section 10(b)
did not reveal a clear congressional intent either to include nonpurchasers
and nonsellers within the scope of section 10(b) or exclude them.2' Since
the statute expressly confers standing, however, upon holders of contractual rights to purchase or sell,22 the Horst court found inapplicable the
policy considerations relevant to the exclusion of nonpurchasers and nonsellers.? Given the express wording of the '34 Act, the court held that an
oral purchase order is a contract to buy securities since the definitional
provisions of the statute make no distinction between oral and written
24
contracts .
'1Id. at 92,462. During the weeks following placement of the order, the defendants
continued to assure plaintiff that the stock would be purchased and that confirmation slips
would be sent. Id. The complaint alleged also that defendants' fraudulent conduct was part
of a scheme to convert plaintiffs' "free credit balance" which the brokerage firm carried for
plaintiffs' account. Id. Investors commonly maintain such accounts to facilitate financing
securities transactions.
," Id. at 92,463.
20

21

See note 4 supra.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.

SEC.

L. REP. (CCH)

96,213 at 92,463; see 421 U.S.

at 737.
See §§ 3(a)(13) & (14), '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) & (14) (1970); note 9 supra.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213 at 92,463-64. The Horst
court did not feel compelled to analyze the issue whether the plaintiff was a statutory purchaser in light of the policy considerations of the Blue Chip decision. The court found,
nonetheless, that contractual rights to purchase or sell securities based upon oral agreements
do not appear to raise the same problem of uncorroborrated oral testimony as when no contractual rights are asserted by nontrading plaintiffs. Id. at 96,464. In the first instance, a
plaintiff presents to the trier of fact a concrete factual claim of the existence of a contractual
relationship. In the latter situation, a plaintiff alleging defendant's fraud as the motive for
failure to enter into a contract to buy or sell securities presents testimony as to
"circumstances wholly within the subjective realm, 'unknown and unknowable to the defendant.'" Id., quoting 421 U.S. at 746. The jury then "does not even have the benefit of
weighing plaintiffs' version against the defendants'." Id.
'1 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213 at 92,463-64. In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court did not reach the question whether
an oral contract must be enforceable to support standing. The oral purchase order appeared
to be unenforceable as a contract for the purchase of securities under the state statute of
frauds. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 8-319 (McKinney 1964). Decisions are split as to the applica21
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The federal district court for the Southern District of New York took a
more restrictive approach in Tucker v. NationalStudent Marketing Corp.,,
when considering what contractual rights to purchase or sell securities are
required to support standing under Rule 10b-5. Tucker involved registration rights provided in an employment contract executed between the
plaintiff and the defendant corporation. Under the contract, the corporation retained an option to repurchase decreasing quantities of its unregistered and nontransferable common stock delivered to plaintiff as compensation for his services. 6 The contract granted the plaintiff the right to have
any stock released from the repurchase option registered by the defendant
at defendant's expenseY The plaintiff alleged that as part of a scheme to
prevent him from disposing of his shares on the open market, the defendant fraudulently breached its contractual obligation to register plaintiff's
shares.2 The plaintiff eventually sold a portion of his stock through private
placements 2 at a substantial loss. 5
bility of state contract law in determing the existence or enforceability of contract rights
relied upon for jurisdictional purposes in Rule 10b-5 actions. Compare Ohashi v. Verit Indus.
Inc., 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976) (state contract law applied to
find contract enforceable) with Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court
refused to apply state statute of fraud to an oral contract). See generally, 1976-1977Developments, supra note 5, at 889-92.
" [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
1977).
28 Id. at 92,331. Pursuant to the employment contract, the plaintiff received five thousand shares of the corporation's unregistered and nontransferable common stock. The number
of shares subject to the repurchase option was reduced to zero over a three year period. Id.
Shares released from the repurchasing option could be transferred by plaintiff only if registered under the '33 Act which prohibits the offering or selling of a security without compliance
with the registration requirements of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970). See generally 1 L.
Loss, SEcuarnEs REGULATION ch. 3 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
2 Section 3(g) of the contract provided:
Tucker shall at all times, have the option to have any stock of NSMS which shall
have been released from the option to repurchase granted to NSMS, registered at
the expense of NSMS, at any time NSMS shall apply for a registration of any
NSMS stock, subsequent to the initial registration, "initial registration" being
deemed to mean the first registration for a public offering of any stock of NSMS.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 96,181 at 92,331.
2 The defendant allegedly failed to notify the plaintiff when it registered 54,285 shares
with the SEC in October 1969. The plaintiff learned of the registration and inquired whether
his shares were to be registered. The plaintiff claimed that an officer of the corporation told
him that plaintiff's shares could not be included in the October registration, but that the
shares would be included in a subsequent registration statement. A further registration statement was never filed. Id. at 92,331. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants prevented
registration of his shares as part of a scheme to sell their own shares at a high market price
through numerous private placements. Id. In addition to 10b-5 violations, the plaintiff asserted breach of contract and common law fraud theories for recovery. Id.
§ 4(2) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), provides an exemption from the registration requirements for transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering. See
generally S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SEcuRIEs (1975); Schwartz,
The Private Offering Exemption-Recent Developments, 37 OHIo L.J. 1 (1976).
0 On the effective date of the registration, the defendant corporation's stock sold for an
average price of $46 per share on the over the counter market. Plaintiff claimed that had his
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Although the employment contract could have been considered as a
contract for the purchase of securities, 3' the court in Tucker held that the
securities registration rights did not constitute such a contract. The defendant's breach of its obligation to register plaintiff's shares, therefore, did
not constitute a breach of a contractual agreement to purchase or sell
securities. 2 Since the plaintiffs retention of stock was not the result of a
breached contract to sell,33 the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet
the purchase-seller requirement and dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing. 4
The decision in Tucker is consistent with the import of Blue Chip that
where contract rights are asserted, only actual contractual relationships"
that confer enforceable legal rights to purchase or sell securities38 satisfy
shares been included in the October 1969 registration statement he would have sold his shares
for $460,000. Plaintiff eventually realized $28,312 from private placements and sales approved
by the SEC. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,181 at 92,331.
, See Rukin v. Collins, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972) (stock option agreement
granted plaintiff to induce him to enter employ of corporation constitutes a sale of securities
to plaintiff under 1934 Act); cf. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F. 2d 1223,
1242-43 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978) (Nos. 77-753,
77-754) (union member's interest in an involuntary non-contributory pension plan is a security and decision to take employment offering such a plan is an investment decision).
31[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,181 at 92,332.
3 Plaintiff actually did sell a portion of his shares through private placements and other
exempt transactions. Even though the value of plaintiff's shares had diminished substantially, such sales were unrelated to the alleged fraud. Id. In dictum in Blue Chip, the Supreme
Court expressly doubted that nonselling shareholders whose investments suffer loss in value
due to corporate or insider activities have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. 421 U.S. at 738;
see Ohashi v. Verit Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff in Tucker
could maintain a 10b-5 claim only as an aborted seller because "mere retention of a security,
even if induced by defendant's fraud, does not state a claim under section 10(b)." [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,181 at 332; see O'Brien v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F.
Supp. 1154, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,181 at 92,332.
35In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding that an offer to
purchase securities made pursuant to a judicial decree was functionally equivalent to a
contractual right to purchase or sell securities within the meaning of the definitional provisions of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a(c)(13) & (14)(1970); see note 9 supra. The plaintiffs
asserted that, but for defendant's fraud, they would have participated in securities transactions as purchasers and sellers pursuant to an antitrust consent decree intended for their
benefit. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd
421 U.S. 723 (1975). Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in Manor Drug Stores, stated that "the
unifying link among cases granting standing to persons who did not buy or sell 'is the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties which elevated the plaintiffs to the
status of statutory purchasers or sellers."' 492 F.2d at 143-44 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting),
quoting Mount Clemerns Indus. Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1973). Requiring that
plaintiffs be party to an actual contractual agreement for the purchase or sale of securities
will limit the number of breach of contract actions that will be allowed under Rule 10b-5.
"' After Blue Chip, a plaintiff must be party to a contractual agreement for the purchase
or sale of securities for purposes of standing under Rule lob-5. The Blue Chip Court recognized that contractual purchasers and sellers within the meaning of the definitional provi-
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the purchaser-seller requirement. Limitation of standing to frustrated
holders of rights to purchase and sell securities furthers the policy expressed in Blue Chip of structuring the rules of standing under Rule 10b-5
so as to avoid speculative and vexatious litigation.37 The existence of a
contract furnishes objectively demonstrable facts such as price, quantity,
and time of purchase or sale of securities. 3 A contract further evinces
plaintiff's intention to trade, thus providing evidence of causation. Finally,
the contract requirement limits defendant's liability to an easily identifiable class of plaintiffs, thereby3 reducing the possibility of strike suits
founded on speculative claims. 1
The district court for the Southern District of New York determined in
Green v. Hamilton InternationalCorp. 0 that holders of convertible debentures had contractual rights sufficient for them to satisfy the purchaserseller requirement. In Green, the plaintiffs redeemed their convertible debentures in the defendant corporation at maturity. The plaintiffs claimed
that they were defrauded by defendants' failure to disclose merger negotiations and an impending merger offer until after plaintiffs elected to redeem
rather than convert."' The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss,
holding that the redemption transaction itself constituted a purchase and
sale of securities within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. 2 Further, the court
concluded that as owners of convertible debentures, the plaintiffs possessed contractual rights to acquire stock in the defendant corporation
throughout the period during which plaintiffs could have redeemed prior
sions of the '34 Act include "holders of puts, calls, options, and other contractual rights or
duties to purchase or sell securities. . . ." 421 U.S. at 751; see Gauer v. Genesco, Inc. [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,344 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In Gauer,the court
held that a contractual right to participate in a "come along" registration of securities did
not constitute a contractual right to sell securities within the meaning of the statutory definition of "sale". Id. at 98,710; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14)(1970). A "come along" registration

occurs when a shareholder joins his shares with those of the issuer for the purpose of registration under the '33 Act.
See note 4 supra.
See 421 U.S. at 747; Gauer v. Genesco, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REp. (CCH) 95,344 at 98,710 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1975).
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141-43 (9th Cir. 1973).
' 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'

Plaintiffs could have converted their debentures into shares of common stock at the

conversion rate of $2.25 per share on October 31, 1976, the redemption date. Id. at 726. During

the two week period prior to the redemption date, defendant's common stock traded publicly
"well below" the conversion rate. Id. Plaintiffs actually redeemed on November 1. On that
same day, defendant received a written offer proposing to acquire defendant by purchasing

defendant's outstanding stock at $4.00 per share. Id.
The court noted a twofold financial advantage that accrued to the defendants due to
plaintiff's election to redeem rather than convert. First, defendant did not have to issue shares
to cover the conversion. Second, the acquiring corporation did not have to consider the value
of those shares when calculating the merger offer price. Id.
"

437 F. Supp. at 727; see Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 737 (2d Cir. 1972)(en

banc). Section 3(a)(10) of the '34 Act defines "security" as including any debenture. 15
U.S.C. §.78c(a)(10)(1970).
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to actual redemption." Since this contract right met the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale"," the plaintiffs satisfied the purchaserseller requirement. Plaintiffs had standing to sue, therefore, for any fraudulent nondisclosure occurring before the redemption date because such
fraud occurred in connection with a purchase or sale of securities." Although a retained contractual right to convert, which is exercisable over a
period of time, does not furnish all the objectively demonstrable facts
sought in Blue Chip,46 such a right does fall within the statutory definition
of purchase. Further, this result comports with the policy objective of
averting vexatious litigation since the plaintiffs' class was limited to holders of convertible debentures.
The court considered an additional element in analyzing whether contractual rights to purchase or sell securities provided a basis for standing
47
in Neiderhoffer, Cross & Zeckhauser, Inc. v. Telstat Systems, Inc. Despite finding that the plaintiff was a contractual purchaser within the
meaning of section 10(b) of the '34 Act, the court held that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the suit would serve an investment or public
interest promoted by section 10(b). 4s In Neiderhoffer, the plaintiff was an
"acquisition finder" assisting companies that desire to sell their assets.4"
The defendant hired the plaintiff to find a buyer interested in acquiring
the defendant corporation and agreed that if an acquisition occurred, defendant would transfer a portion of the securities received from the buyer
0
to the plaintiff as compensation for plaintiffs services. Although acquisi11437 F. Supp. at 727. See also Camp v. Genesco, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FEm. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,679 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1976) (owners of convertible debentures are holders
of retained contractual rights to purchase and sell securities).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13) & (14)(1970); see note 9 supra. In support of its finding that
the plaintiffs possessed a contractual right sufficient to confer standing under Rule 10b-5, the
court cited the distinction drawn in Blue Chip between the holders of puts, calls, options or
other contractual rights to purchase and sell securities and nonpurchasing offerees who have
no such rights. 437 F. Supp. at 727; see 421 U.S. at 751.
," The decision in Green comports with the policies of strict statutory construction and
restriction of the size of plaintiff's class expressed in Blue Chip. The court in Green could
have found that the plaintiffs properly alleged fraud in connection with the purchase and sale
of securities without reaching the contractual rights issue. The redemption transaction itself
was an actual purchase and sale of securities. 437 F. Supp. at 727. The fraudulent nondisclosure that allegedly had occurred before the date of redemption was in connection with that
transaction. In fact, the nondisclosure preventing plaintiffs from acquiring information which
would have encouraged them to convert rather than redeem was the core of the alleged fraud.
437 F. Supp. at 727.
' See note 4 supra.
" 436 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" Id. at 185.
Typically, an acquisition finder selects a pool of potential buyers, provides them with
detailed reports describing his client's business operations, arranges meetings between the
client and interested buyers, and advises his client on acquisition strategies. Id. at 182, 185.
1 rd. at 181. The compensation agreement was not reduced to writing, but the court
treated the oral agreement as an enforceable oral contract for the purpose of considering
defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 181 n.1 Such an agreement may not satisfy the state
statute of frauds. Compare N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-701a(10) (McKinney 1964 & 1977 Cum.
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tion of the defendant was consummated, the plaintiff was neither responsible for the introduction of the buyer to the defendant nor a participant in
the acquisition negotiations.5 The defendant refused to compensate the
plaintiff under the agreement. The plaintiff charged that defendant's refusal to deliver stock was part of a fraudulent scheme to exploit plaintiffs
advice and services as a means of independently obtaining an acquisition
offer.52
Absent an actual purchase or sale of securities, a plaintiff who asserts
standing as a frustrated contractual purchaser must possess contractual
rights which meet the statutory definitions. Section 3(a)(13) of the '34 Act
defines the terms "buy" and "purchase" as including "any contract to buy,
or purchase, or otherwise acquire" securities. 3 The court in Neiderhoffer
acknowledged that the existence of an enforceable employment contract
conferred on the plaintiff a contractual right to receive securities." The
court declared, however, that to establish standing under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove more than literal compliance with the
statutory definitions. In analyzing whether the plaintiff had standing, the
court noted that the parameters of the judicially created right of action
under section 10(b) are established by the congressional purposes of protecting investors and the public interest." Relying on recent Supreme
Court decisions restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5 actions," the
Neiderhoffer court reasoned that in private actions for damages, only litigants whose suits will serve an "investment
interest" or a "public interest"
57
under the '34 Act have standing to sue.
The Neiderhoffer court did not elaborate, however, on what constitutes
investor or public interest and how the requirement of such an interest
affects the purchaser-seller requirement. The court merely concluded that
Supp.) (statute of frauds provision applicable to employment contracts) with N.Y. U.C.C.
LAw. § 8-319 (McKinney 1964) (statute of frauds applicable to sale of securities). Further-

more, the court expressed concern that the compensation term, "a portion of the securities"
of the acquiring corporation, might be too indefinite, thus rendering the contract unenforceable. 436 F. Supp. at 183 n.3.
11436 F. Supp. at 182.
52 Id.

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)(1970); see note 9 supra.
436 F. Supp. at 183.
Id. at 183-84. The court noted that pursuant to § 10(b) of the '34 Act, the SEC is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(1970); see A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir.
1967). The Niederhoffer court read this language as limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5. See text
accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
"' See Lowenfels, supra note 1.
5'436 F. Supp. at 187. In ruling that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue, the court
relied on language in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), stating that the
judicially created private right of action under § 10(b) should not be implied where it is
unnecessary to ensure fulfillment of the congressional purpose. Id. at 477. See also Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977). The SantaFe Court described the fundamental
purpose of the '34 Act as the implementation of a philosophy of full disclosure. 430 U.S. at
478.
13
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although the acquisition finder was a statutory purchaser, the plaintiff had
no investment interest in identifiable securities, 5 and that plaintiff's suit,
which bespoke the frustration of a private contractual expectancy, did not
advance the public interest."5 The Neiderhoffer decision demonstrates the
extent to which lower courts considering the standing issue can be expected
to retrench in the face of recent Supreme Court decisions which have taken
a restrictive and conservative approach to the Rule 10b-5 private action."
Prior to Blue Chip, finding an investment interest or public interest, in the
absence of an actual purchase or sale of securities, provided the means by
which courts circumvented the Birnbaum limitation on standing so as to
effect a broad policy of remedying securities fraud.6 ' The Blue Chip decision required strict fidelity to the statutory language as a means of cutting
back the increasing amount of Rule 10b-5 litigation. By requiring proof of
an investor or public interest apart from proof of purchaser-seller status,
the Neiderhoffer court has appended an additional element, not specifically mandated by Blue Chip, onto the purchaser-seller requirement.
Exceptions to the Purchaser-SellerRequirement
During the past year, lower courts have continued the case-by-case
process of determining the validity of judicially created exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule.12 The forced seller and de facto seller exceptions both received judicial approval. 3 The forced seller doctrine provides that a non" 436 F. Supp. at 185. The court found that the acquisition finder's role as "marriagebroker" between corporations could not have given rise to an investment interest in identified
securities. Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff neither made an investment decision
nor assumed any investment risk with respect to the securities of the defendant corporation.
Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not an independent investor, but simply defendant's agent.
Id. at 186. The acquisition finder argued, however, that its situation was indistinguishable
from the line of cases in which plaintiffs who had bargained to receive securities had standing
because their bargains had been aborted by defendant sellers who had no intention of fulfilling the contractual agreements. See, e.g., Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 333, 336 n.4. (3d Cir. 1974); Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973);
Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec,
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The plaintiffs in these cases, however, acted independently and exercised considerable investment discretion. 436 F. Supp. at 185.
" Where the fraudulent conduct threatened the integrity of "free and open securities
markets nurtured in a climate of free dealing", Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1970), several pre-Blue Chip courts found that noninvestors had standing because their suits
advanced a significant public interest within the protective purpose of § 10(b). See, e.g.,
Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973) (shareholders permitted to sue
where defendant entered into contract for purpose of speculating on fluctuations in stock
price); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (investment broker had
standing to sue customers who placed purchase orders intending to pay for stock only if
market price increased); Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960) (corporation fraudulently induced to issue overvalued or worthless stock permitted to
sue).
.' See note 1 supra.
6'See Lowenfels supra note 1.
62

See note 5 supra.

11 See text accompanying notes 64-78 infra (forced seller exception); text accompanying
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trading investor will be treated as a seller for purposes of the purchaserseller requirement when the nature of his investment has been fundamentally changed from an interest in a going enterprise into a right to receive
a payment of money.64 In Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 5 the court
invoked the forced seller exception to grant standing to limited partners
of a partnership66 formed to construct and sell a highrise condominium
building. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that through the fraudulent conveyance
of substantially all of the partnership assets,' the defendant general partners transformed plaintiffs' investment interest in a functioning enterprise
into a right to receive cash. " In denying defendants' motion to dismiss, the
court held that although the plaintiffs did not actually sell securities, they
were within the scope of the forced seller exception.
The court rejected defendant's contention that the plaintiffs did not fit
the forced seller exception. 70 The defendants asserted that in all previous
notes 79-105 infra (de facto seller exception).
61Dudley v. Southeastern Factor and Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); see, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (fraudulently executed short-form merger forced minority shareholders either to sell at greatly reduced price or retain stock in nonexistent company); Coffee
v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (fraudulent liquidation of corporation converted shares into limited claims for cash).
434 F. Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1977).
go Both the '33 and '34 Acts include in the definition of "security" an "investment
contract." See '33 Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1970); '34 Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10)(1970). Although the Houlihan court did not explain how plaintiff's investment
interest fit the definition of security, under the investment contract approach courts and the
SEC have treated limited partnership interests as securities for purposes of the federal securities laws. See generally 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURrTES AND FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAW § 2.1212]
(1976). Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTNGs L.J. 219 (1974).
'7 The 1972 partnership agreement required the general partners to obtain approval of
at least sixty percent of the total partnership interests before disposing of the partnership
assets which consisted of the land and improvements. 434 F. Supp. at 1332. By June, 1974,
the condominium project faced severe financial and construction problems. Pursuant to the
partnership agreement, the general partners resigned their interests in the project on June
30, 1974, in favor of the limited partners, who had received no return on their original
investment. Id. In August, 1974, the general contractor filed a mechanics lien for payment
due on the project. Id.
" Plaintiffs alleged that the general partners conspired to liquidate all or substantially
all the partnership assets contrary to the rights and' interests of the limited partners as set
forth in the partnership agreement. 434 F. Supp. at 1333. Plaintiffs were excluded from the
negotiation and settlement of claims against the condominium project. Id. at 1332-33. By the
terms of the settlement agreement, the general partners conveyed, apparently without obtaining the approval of sixty percent of the partnership interests, the partnership land and
building to the construction lender, the holder of the purchase money mortgage, the general
contractor and a general partner. Id. at 1333.
"AUnder the settlement agreement negotiated between the general partners and the
creditors of the project, see note 68 supra, the limited partners were granted a conditional
right to purchase condominium units when completed. Rejecting the conditions as unacceptable, the limited partners argued that defendants' fraud converted their interests into a right
to receive payments of money. 434 F. Supp. at 1333.
70 Defendant argued that the forced seller exception applies only if the plaintiff is forced
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decisions applying the forced seller doctrine, the fraudulent activities of
defendants defeated plaintiffs' expectation that the enterprise in which
they had invested would have continuing vitality.' The defendants in
Houlihan argued that without such an expectation the forced seller exception could not apply. Since the partnership was formed for the limited
purpose of developing a single condominium project, the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs could not have had any expectation that the
enterprise would continue.12 The Houlihan court refused to read an
"expectation of continuing vitality" requirement into the forced seller exception. The plaintiffs' expectation that the enterprise would terminate
upon the sale of the condominium units was held irrelevant to the question
whether plaintiffs' ownership interests had been fundamentally and involuntarily transformed. 3 The condominium project was a going enterprise at
the time the limited partners invested. The plaintiffs had no expectation
that their investment interest would be disposed of fraudulently and prematurely before they had an opportunity to realize a return on their investment. "
The Houlihan court properly applied the forced seller exception in finding that the limited partners had standing. The court failed, however, to
consider the effect of Blue Chip on the forced seller doctrine. The court
relied on several pre-Blue Chip cases and assumed that the forced seller
75
exception has all its pre-Blue Chip vitality. Although the Houlihancourt
did not analyze the forced seller exception in the light of Blue Chip, finding
that the limited partners had standing as forced sellers was consistent with
to dispose of his securities at some ascertainable point in time. 434 F. Supp. at 1333. Even
though the limited partners eventually tendered their partnership interests, they were not
compelled to do so. Id. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that compulsion
inheres where a plaintiff is left with only the alternatives of exchanging his securities for
grossly inadequate consideration or retaining stock in a nonexistent or nonfunctioning entity.
Id.: see Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967). Requiring plaintiffs to
dispose of their securities at some point as a pre-requisite to gaining forced seller status would
be a "needless formality." 374 F.2d at 634. The court also rejected the contention that
plaintiffs' investments were not fundamentally changed, but merely suffered a diminution
in value which does not constitute a forced sale. 343 F.2d at 1338; see In Re Penn Central
Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1974).
434 F. Supp. at 1338.
72 Id. at 1338-39.
Id. at 1339.
7' Id.
7 Id. at 1337. The court relied on several forced seller cases that were decided at a time
when lower courts interpreted the Birnbaum rule flexibly. See Dudley v. Southeastern Factor
and Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1967); note 64 supra. The weakness of the Houlihancourt's analysis lies in the failure to
discuss the impact of Blue Chip on the forced seller claim before the court. Other decisions
have validated the forced seller exception after Blue Chip. See Weisman v. Darneille, [19771978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,278 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1978); Alpex
Computer Corp. v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Rich v. Touche
Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assoc., 411 F. Supp.
287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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the policy objectives announced in Blue Chip. Although there was no actual sale of securities in Houlihan, the impending sale caused by the conversion of plaintiffs' securities from investments in a going enterprise into
claims for money, provided the objective facts required by Blue Chip." The
trier of fact can determine from the alleged forced sale the number of
shares involved, the price paid for each and their value at the time of the
forced sale. The dangers of an unlimited class of plaintiffs and speculative
claims based on uncorroborated testimony do not arise. 7 Thus, the application of the forced seller exception to the plaintiffs
in Houlihan would not
7
encourage strike suits or vexatious litigation. 1
Courts have also recently considered the de facto seller exception,
which permits the beneficial owner of securities to sue when strict application of the purchaser-seller requirement would confer standing only upon
the legal titleholder who actually purchased or sold securities.7 In the past,
the de facto seller exception has been applied where the fraudulent conduct of a fiduciary has directly affected the investment interests of the
nontransacting party." Although the exception developed in cases involving sales of securities, hence the phrase "de facto seller," the rationale of
the exception applies equally to purchases of securities. Recent decisions
have applied the de facto seller exception; however, the extent to which
the exception remains valid after Blue Chip is not clear.
Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors,8' involved a Rule 10b-5 action
against a real estate investment trust. The plaintiff Duban, who was the
sole beneficiary of a retirement investment trust, had instructed the trustee, pursuant to his reserved powers under the retirement trust agreement,12 to purchase the defendant's securities. The plaintiff claimed that
the defendant's misrepresentations and omissions caused overvaluation of
the DMI securities and concealed the true financial condition of the defendant from the public, thereby causing the plaintiff to buy the securities at
inflated prices.83 Noting that the purchaser-seller requirement has been
construed flexibly in the past, the court relied on several pre-Blue Chip
decisions and concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue as a de
facto buyer.84
"' See 421 U.S. at 747.
" See note 4 supra.
" See Standing Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 4, at 434-35; 1976-1977 Developments,
supra note 5, at 895 n.77; Failureto Solve, supra note 5, at 987-89. But see Gallagher, supra
note 4, at 36-37.
"' See note 5 supra.
" See James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973), Heyman v. Heyman, 356
F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Notwithstanding the power and authority of the trustee to make investnent decisions
for the benefit of the beneficiary, the trust agreement provided that the beneficiary reserved
the right and power to control the investment of trust funds. 431 F. Supp. at 1092. The trustee
was absolved from liability when acting at the beneficiary's direction. Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1085.
The Gross court cited James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) and
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In another de facto buyer case the district court refused to grant standing to a trust beneficiary who sued the trustee. In O'Brien v. Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.," the trustee had complete discretion
to purchase or sell securities,"6 subject only to the beneficiaries' right to
ratify or disapprove the investment decision. 7 In analyzing the standing
issue, the court noted that recent Supreme Court decisions require courts
to scrutinize carefully whether granting a remedy under the federal securities laws is appropriate. 8 Although the court concluded that the plaintiff
did not have standing, it refused to accept the defendant's contention that
after Blue Chip a trust beneficiary lacks standing in all cases to sue his
trustee under Rule 10b-5. 81
Judicial acceptance or rejection of the de facto seller exception cannot
be justified, however, without clear analysis of the mandate of Blue Chip
and other recent Supreme Court decisions. Unfortunately, neither the
Gross nor the O'Brien decisions developed any rationale for the continued
Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), as authority for finding that a trust
beneficiary can be a de facto seller. In both James and Heyman the plaintiffs were trust
beneficiaries who sued their trustees for fraudulently selling securities from the trusts. In each
case, the court looked beyond the distinction between technical and beneficial ownership of
securities and granted the beneficiary standing to sue as a de facto seller. See 483 F.2d at
948; 356 F. Supp. at 966. Both courts emphasized that the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement should be construed flexibly in order to achieve the anti-fraud purpose of the securities
laws to protect the investing public and ensure honest dealings in securities transactions. See
483 F.2d at 948; 356 F. Supp. at 966. The Gross court failed, however, to discuss the impact
of Blue Chip upon the precedential value of the James and Heyman decisions. Any analysis
of the de facto seller exception which does not consider the clear mandate of Blue Chip to
construe strictly the purchaser-seller requirement must be considered inadequate.
431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 295; see note 1 supra.
The court cited without analysis James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.
1973), see note 84 supra, and Klamberg v. Roth, 425 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), as
authority for the continued validity of the de facto seller exception. 431 F. Supp. at 295. In
Klam berg, the beneficiary of an employee profit-sharing retirement plan brought a Rule 10b5 action against the successor trustees. The plaintiff alleged that the trustees reinvested more
than seventy percent of the trust assets in the successor corporation despite the steady decline
of the market price of the company's stock. Id. at 441. The court noted that in
"unconventional situations", such as the one before the court, pre-Blue Chip exceptions to
the Birnbaum rule are valid precedent. Id. at 442. Relying on several pre-Blue Chip cases,
the Klamberg court concluded that the beneficiary of a trust has standing to assert a rule
10b-5 claim against a trustee, "at least where the actions challenged are not arms-length
transactions by the trustee." Id., quoting Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court did not, however, reevaluate the de facto seller doctrine in light
of the Blue Chip Court's careful attention to the statutory language of the '34 Act and concern
for the need to limit the potential class of plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 actions. See 1976-1977
Developments, supra note 5, at 895-97.
Despite the Klamberg court's failure to mention Blue Chip in upholding the de facto
seller exception, subsequent courts have cited the case with approval. See, e.g., Daniel v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977) (right to receive benefits under
a noncontributory pension plan constitutes a security); Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 438 F.
Supp. 803 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (beneficiary has standing to sue trustee for Rule 10b-5 violation).
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validity of the de facto seller exception other than that offered by pre-Blue
Chip decisions. 0 Two principal objections to the de facto seller exception
have been raised in light of Blue Chip. First, the Blue Chip Court's emphasis on the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" indicates an
unwillingness to allow the purchaser-seller requirement to be circumvented.2 Second, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that plaintiffs
who have an adequate state law remedy should not be found to have
standing under the federal securities laws. 3
These objections can be effectively answered. First, the de facto seller
exception is an equitable doctrine which operates to satisfy the purchaserseller requirement in situations where the plaintiff has not actually purchased or sold securities within the meaning of the definitional provisions
of the '34 Act. But like the shareholder derivative action exception,94 in
which the corporation actually trades, and the forced seller exception in
which there is a constructive sale,95 the de facto seller exception involves a
purchase or sale of securities that supplies the demonstrable evidence necessary to avoid problems associated with oral testimony and speculative
damages.9 Furthermore, the economic interest of a de facto seller in an
actual purchase or sale of securities by the fiduciary is sufficiently distinct
that vexatious litigation or strike suits will not be encouraged by finding
that this limited class of plaintiffs has standing. Second, in cases where
a trust beneficiary brings a Rule 10b-5 action against his trustee for breach
of a fiduciary obligation or for corporate mismanagement in connection
with a securities transaction, dismissal from federal court is appropriate.
The Supreme Court recently held in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green'
that allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty which involve no
"deceptions" or "manipulations" do not state a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. Since breach of fiduciary duty is a matter traditionally relegated to
state regulation, 11 the plaintiff should be required to challenge the transaction complained of in state court. The Supreme Court's decision in Santa
Fe compels this result, however, not the purchaser-seller requirement
'Q

See note 84 supra.

A de facto seller has neither actually purchased or sold securities, nor possessed contractual rights to purchase or sell, see note 5 supra, within the meaning of the statutory
provisions of the '34 Act. See note 9 supra.
92In addition to denying standing to a nonpurchasing offeree, the Blue Chip majority
indicated in dictum that nontrading shareholders, creditors and others related to the issuer
whose investments diminished in value as a result of fraudulent insider or corporate activity
do not have standing under Rule lOb-5. 421 U.S. at 738. Arguably, trust beneficiaries are
covered by this broad exclusion. See id.
92See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 426 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See generally 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 5, at 896-97.
"

, See note 5 supra.

Id.; see text accompanying notes 64-83 supra.
" See note 4 supra.
'7
"
"

See Gallagher, supra note 4, at 37-38.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 476. See generally 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 5, at 929-37.

'® 430 U.S. at 478.
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adopted in its Blue Chip decision. Under the Santa Fe analysis, deception
by the trustee is actionable under Rule 10b-5 only if the trustee has an
obligation to disclose investment decisions to the beneficiary before the
transaction."0 ' Applying this analysis to O'Brien, the district court found
that the beneficiary failed to state a cause of action because the complaint
against the trustee alleging breach of fiduciary duty did not involve deception within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.111 In Gross, however, the court found
that the plaintiff had standing as a de facto buyer. There the plaintiff did
not allege any breach of fiduciary duty or fraudulent activity by the trustee, who was in fact absolved from any liability. 03 Rather, the plaintiff
made the investment decision and undertook an investment risk when he
instructed the trustee, in reliance on defendant's misrepresentations,10 to
purchase shares in the defendant trust. In cases such as Gross, the policy
of the de facto seller exception to permit the real party in interest to protect
his investment interests under Rule 10b-5 should remain valid. 105
The "In Connection With" Requirement
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 reach only fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."'' Distinct from the purchaserseller requirement contained in this language is the requirement that the
alleged fraud be connected with a securities transaction.'0 7 In the absence
of statutory or congressional guidance as to how close or direct a connection
is necessary, courts have developed several approaches to the connection
requirement. 00 Recent decisions have split on the degree of connection
"I2See O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 431 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
"I Id. at 297. The court held that since the defendants as trustees of a discretionary trust,
owed no duty to disclose the investment decisions, they did not engage in any deception. Id.
at 292. Furthermore, no manipulation within the meaning of Santa Fe was alleged since the
fiduciary's purchase of high risk securities to protect its own loans to the issuing corporations
would not artifically affect market activity. Id.; see 430 U.S. at 476.
Under similar analysis, the case of Klamberg v. Roth, 425 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
see note 89 supra, was decided incorrectly. There, the plaintiff's allegations were based
strictly on a breach of fiduciary duty. Such allegations are insufficient in light of Santa Fe.
See generally 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 5, at 895-97.
' 431 F. Supp. at 1092-93.
i" Id. at 1086.
I0 Cf. Neiderhoffer, Cross & Zeckhauser, Inc. v. Telstat Sys., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holder of contractual right to purchase or sell securities must prove an
investment interest as prerequisite to standing under 10b-5). See also Fitzsimmons v. Old
Security Life Ins. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,236 (N.D.
Ill.
Nov. 2, 1977) (representatives of trust beneficiaries denied standing after Blue Chip).
I" Section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 both contain the "in connection with"
language. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
017 See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 1OB-5, § 4.7 (570)(577) (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; A. JACOBS, supra note 11, at § 38.01; Note,
SEC Rule 1Ob-5-"In Connection With The Purchaseor Sale of Any Security" Restriction:
The Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROs. 28 (1969).
20' The broadest interpretation to date of the "in connection with" language was an-
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necessary to satisfy the statutory language.
9
In Halperin v. Edwards & Hanly, " the "in connection with" requirement was considered in light of the Blue Chip decision. Although the
Supreme Court in Blue Chip did not address the connection requirement,
the Halperin court held that reaffirmation of the Birnbaum rule dictates
that only fraud preceding or accompanying a securities transaction is "in
nounced by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Life Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). The Court construed the connection requirement to reach deceptive practices "touching" the purchase or sale of securities. Id. at 12-13. Subsequent decisions have
consistently applied the touching standard broadly and have found the requisite connection
even where the fraudulent conduct only tangentially involved a securities transaction. See,
e.g., Jannes v. Microwave Communications Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972) (purpose of sale
of securities was to give color of legitimacy to fraudulent misrepresentations); Drachman v.
Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 736-38 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (redemption of convertible debentures
to prevent dilution of control position in a takeover bid). See generally Note, The Controlling
Influence StandardIn Rule 10b-5 CorporateMismanagement Cases, 86 HARV.L. Rav. 1007,
1013-14 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. Ray. 50, 263-64 (1972).
The Supreme Court's failure to delineate the limits of the touching standard has led some
courts to define the degree of connection necessary to sustain a Rule 10b-5 action. The phrase
"inconnection with" has been interpreted to mean that fraudulent conduct must occur prior
to or contemporaneously with the securities transaction. See Halperin v. Edwards & Hanly,
430 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Kogan v. National Bank, 402 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Pepsico, Inc., v. W. R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Where
the alleged fraud occurs, however, after the execution of a contract to purchase or sell securities and the fraud results in the breach of the contract, courts have held the fraud to be in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities. See Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849
(1976); Horst v. W. T. Cabe & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. 96,213
(CCH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977).
Several courts have interpreted the connection language as requiring a causal relationship between the alleged fraud and the securities transaction. See, e.g., Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1976) (connection requirement involves causal
connection between fraud and securities transaction); Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029, 1030
(9th Cir. 1973) (connection requirement not satisfied because plaintiffs did not purchase or
sell in reasonable reliance upon the alleged misrepresentations). In analyzing the connection
requirement in terms of causation, several courts have distinguished between loss causation
and transaction causation. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1974); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally BROMBERG, supra note 107, at §§ 4.7
(551), 8.7; Note, Loss and TransactionCausation:The Second CircuitResolves the Causation
Controversy in Majority Control Situations, 32 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 683 (1975). Loss causation establishes that the fraud caused, in fact, the plaintiffs economic injury. BROMBERG,
supra note 107, at § 4.7 (511). Transaction causation analysis determines whether the causal
connection between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities was sufficient to satisfy
the language of section 10(b). Id. Courts have not always found a clear distinction between
loss causation and transaction causation. See, e.g., Horst v. W. T. Cabe & Co., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213, at 92,465 (term "transaction causation"
applied to relationship between fraud and plaintiff's injury). Analysis of the connection
requirement in terms of causation may be merely an alternative method of incorporating the
elements of materiality and reliance, which have traditionally constituted causation, into the
Rule 10b-5 cause of action. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 n.11
(2d Cir. 1974). Although the concepts of causation and connection are closely intertwined,
one commentator has urged that proof of causation should not be an absolute prerequisite to
establishing connection. A. JAcoBs, supra note 11, at § 38.01.
10 430 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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connection with" a purchase or sale of securities."10 In Halperin,the plaintiff alleged that defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by fraudulently inducing
him to invest in a limited partnership and to retain his investment."'
Although the court held that the plaintiff properly alleged fraud in connection with his investment, it dismissed claims against several defendants
who had joined the partnership after plaintiff's investment because their
fraudulent conduct could not have been in connection with the original
investment.' 2 The district court's dismissal of the claims was consistent
with dictum in Blue Chip to the effect that shareholders who simply retain
their shares because of fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure concerning the desirability of their investment do not have standing under
Rule 10b-5."'
In Horst v. W, T. Cabe & Co." 4 the district court for the Southern
District of New York held that the connection language of Rule 10b-5
covers fraud committed after the execution of a contract for the purchase
or sale of securities."' In Horst, the plaintiff placed a stock-purchase order
with the defendant brokerage firm. The order, which created a contractual
right to purchase securities,"' was never executed and the defendants allegedly misrepresented their intention to execute the order, thereby violating Rule 10b-5. The defendants' fraud neither preceded the contractual
relationship nor induced formation of the contract; the fraud occurred
during the course of the contractual relationship."7 The Horst court held
that although the "in connection with" language requires a reasonable
"transactional nexus" between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiffs
Id. at 125; see Kogan v. National Bank, 402 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
430 F. Supp. at 124. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants, partners in a limited
partnership, failed to inform him that his investment in their firm would be speculative and
risky in view of plaintiff's lack of sophistication in financial matters. Id. at 122-23. Plaintiff
alleged further that defendant's continuing failure to reveal the true risks until several years
later fraudulently induced plaintiff to retain his investment. Id. at 123.
"I2Id. at 123-24. The plaintiff argued that alterations of the partnership agreement
executed subsequent to the original investment amounted to a "purchase" of securities. Id.
at 124; see Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1179-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court
held, however, that modification of the rights of the plaintiff did not significantly change the
nature of the investment of the investment risks and, thus, qualify as a purchase of a new
security. 430 F. Supp. at 124; see Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977).
The three defendants who became partners after the original investment, therefore, could not
be held liable under Blue Chip for fraud in connection with plaintiff's retention of his investment. 430 F. Supp. at 124.
"3 421 U.S. at 737-38. See, e.g., Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976) (pre-prospectus shareholders who retained their shares denied
standing to sue for fraudulent misrepresentations contained in prospectus); Marsh v. Armada
Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (nontendering shareholders do not have standing to complain of a fraudulent tender offer).
"1 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,213 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
1977).
"I Id. at 92,466.
"' Id.
" See text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
"
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injury,"8 the connection requirement was met because the contract to purchase securities remained executory during the period of defendant's misrepresentations." 9 In the court's view, the transaction was a continuing
one, and thus the requisite transactional nexus was present.'20
The Third Circuit, in Ketchum v. Green,'2' recently addressed the question of the degree of "connection" required to satisfy the "in connection
with" language. In Ketchum, a group of officers and directors of a close
corporation conspired successfully to wrest control of the corporation away
from the plaintiffs.' 22 After ouster of the plaintiffs from the board of directors, the board voted to terminate the plaintiffs as employees of the corporation.' = Upon termination, the plaintiffs were compelled to resell their
shares to the corporation'24 pursuant to a stock retirement agreement. The
district court held that the connection between the alleged fraud'1 and the
"' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
"'
2

Id.

96,213 at 92,464-65.

at 92,465.

The court noted that in cases where the securities transaction has been completed,
fraud following the transaction does not occur in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ohashi v. Verit Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d
849 (9th Cir. 1976), the Horst court refused to apply, however, a strict transaction causation
analysis, see note 108 supra, which would have required the plaintiff to prove that defendant's
fraud caused the securities transaction to occur. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,213 at 92,466. The Ohashi court stated the rule that if a contract is still
executory when the fraudulent activity occurs, and if the activities affect the unperformed
part of the bargain, the fraud will be considered to be in connection with the contract to
purchase or sell securities. 536 F.2d at 853. See also Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1976). Applying Ohashi, the Horst court held that the defendant's misrepresentations were
"instrinsic" to the breach of contract to purchase securities. Although the connection requirement could not be satisfied under a transactional causation analysis, the court found the link
between the fraud and plaintiff's injury sufficient under the Ohashi rule. [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213 at 92,466. Extending Rule 10b-5 to reach fraudulent conduct which was intrinsic to the securities transaction in issue, precipitated the breach
of contract, and caused plaintiff's loss, served the policy of the "in connection with" requirement to insure a reasonable relationship between fraud and the purchase or sale of securities.
121 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977).
in Plaintiffs were the former President and former Chairman of the Board of Babb, Inc.,
a closely held corporation. Id. at 1023. The seven defendants were other officers and directors
who conspired to dislodge the plaintiffs as officers of the corporation. Pursuant to their plan,
the entire board was nominated for re-election at the annual shareholders' meeting. Because
the plaintiffs possessed the controlling bloc of stock, the defendants revealed nothing at the
annual meeting about their intention to oppose the re-election of the plaintiffs as officers.
After the shareholders returned all the directors to the board, thus returning the defendants
to their domindnt position, the board rejected the nominating committee's recommendations
and ousted the plaintiffs. The board voted subsequently to terminate plaintiffs as employees
as well. Id. at 1024.
12iId.

"2Id. at 1023. The stock retirement agreement provided for compulsory sale to and
repurchase by the corporation of all shares held by a terminated employee. 415 F. Supp. 1367,
1369 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Although plaintiffs refused to surrender their stock certificates or
accept payment for their shares, id. at 1369-70, plaintiffs had standing to sue as forced sellers.
See id. at 1372; note 7 supra.
121
The plaintiffs alleged that defendant's nondisclosure and tacit misrepresentation to
the shareholders of their intention with respect to the officerships fraudulently induced the
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forced sale of plaintiff's shares was too attenuated to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement of the statute.'26 Although the Third Circuit
accepted the lower court's conclusion and affirmed dismissal of the Rule
10b-5 action, the court did not adopt the trial judge's analysis of the
connection issue.'2
The court of appeals in Ketchum stated that the Supreme Court in
Superintendent of Life Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.'. set
forth the basic rule regarding connection: deceptive practices "touching"
the purchase or sale of securities are within the coverage of Rule 10b-5.'12
The Ketchum court acknowledged that this standard could be interpreted
to reach virtually all intracorporate conflicts that might involve deception.'30 Rather than fix the outer limits of the Bankers Life "touching"
standard, the court set out several factors to be weighed in determining
what constitutes a sufficient connection. The court examined the nature
of the deception alleged, the directness of the connection, and the causal
relationship between the alleged fraud and the securities transaction.' 3'
Applying this analysis to the facts, the court found that the plaintiffs'
allegations concerned principally an internal corporate power struggle
rather than securities fraud. 3 ' Furthermore, the court noted that a subplaintiffs to vote for their own demise. 557 F.2d at 1024. For the purpose of analyzing the "in
connection with" requirement, the district court and the circuit court assumed that the
deception constituted actionable fraud within the meaning of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 415 F.
Supp. at 1371 n.6; 557 F.2d at 1025-26.
'= 415 F. Supp. at 1372.
'" The trial court's analysis of the connection requirement focused solely on whether the
alleged fraud caused the forced sale of stock. Id. at 1371. The court's causation analysis relied
primarily upon the application of materiality and reliance tests which traditionally have been
employed to determine whether defendant's fraud caused plaintiffs injury. See id. Apparently unconvinced that the connection and causation issues are analytically synonymous, the
Third Circuit reconsidered fully the connection requirement. See text accompanying notes
128-37 infra.
12 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
'12 Id. at 12-13. In Bankers Life, the defendants employed an intricate scheme to deplete
the assets of the corporation. Bankers Life had agreed to sell all its stock in Minhattan Life
Insurance Co. The purchaser and his co-conspirators induced Manhattan to sell its treasury
bond holdings, the proceeds of which were used to finance the purchase of Manhattan's stock.
The depletion of assets was concealed by the fraudulent issuance of a certificate of deposit,
ostensibly in exchange for the proceeds of the bond sale. Id. at 7-9: Both the district court
and the Second Circuit held that since the deception involved in converting the bond proceeds
occurrred after their receipt by the corporation, the sale of the treasury bonds was not connected with the alleged fraud. 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970); 300 F. Supp. 1083, 110102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that fraud was sufficiently connected with the securities transaction to bring the misappropriation of the proceeds within
the reach of Rule 10b-5. 404 U.S. at 12-13. One commentator has suggested that the Supreme
Court should have narrowed its interpretation of the connection language to require that the
securities transaction be an "essential link" in the fraudulent scheme and be undertaken for
the purpose of effectuating the fraud. Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv.
50, 264 (1972).
'0 557 F.2d at 1027.
" Id. at 1028-29.
2 In Ketchum, the central element of the controversy was plaintiff's ouster as a result
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stantial number of intermediate events occurred between the fraud and the
ultimate forced sale of stock.' Because these events lacked a tight linkage, 134 the requisite directness was missing. Finally, the court found that
operation of the stock retirement agreement caused the forced sale of stock,
rather than the alleged fraud. 3 The court concluded, therefore, that plaintiffs failed to establish that the fraud was in connection with a purchase
or sale of securities.
Suits arising out of corporate conflicts or mismanagement which may
only incidentally involve a securities transaction have traditionally been
regulated by state corporation law. Realistically, many corporate decisions may touch the purchase or sale of securities.'36 In view of the potentially broad reach of the touching standard into internal corporate affairs,
the Third Circuit's analysis of the connection requirement in Ketchum is
consistent with the trend of recent decisions restricting the scope of action37
able fraud under Rule 10b-5.
B.

The Culpability Standards

Lower courts continue to struggle with the questions left unresolved by
the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder."IRejecting the contention that Rule 10b-5 liability could be founded on negligent misrepresentations or omissions'39 the Hochfelder Court held that a private action for
damages based on Rule 10b-5 would not lie absent an allegation of intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud.' The Court labeled the culpability
of an internal contest for control of the corporation. 557 F.2d at 1027. The court distinguished
the facts in Bankers Life where the securities transaction "undergirded" defendant's fraudulent conduct. Id. at 1028. The Court in Bankers Life stated that § 10(b) was not intended to
reach securities transactions which constitute no more than corporate mismanagement, even
if the "in connection with" requirement is construed flexibly. 404 U.S. at 12. Because the
Ketchum court viewed the alleged fraud as connected with the struggle for control, the court
held that the "internal corporate mismanagement" exception in Bankers Life should apply.
557 F.2d at 1028.
"I The intermediate steps between the fraud and the forced sale included the shareholders' vote subsequent to the misrepresentation, the removal of plaintiffs as officers, and the
termination of the plaintiffs as employees of the corporation. Id.
'1' Id. The court contrasted the Bankers Life case in which the bond transaction was
essential to the misappropriation of the proceeds and the ensuing deception. Id.; see note 129
supra.
m 557 F.2d at 1029. Relying on Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1976), the Ketchum court perceived the connection problem in terms of causation. The court
noted, however, that requiring a showing of causation may prove too much in light of Bankers
Life since the bond sale in that case "only made possible the accomplishment of the fraud as
opposed to having caused it." Id. at 1029 (emphasis in original). The court's view that
connection is not strictly a matter of causation is consistent with the broad touching standard
announced in Bankers Life.
'
557 F.2d at 1029.
12 See note 1 supra.
'
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
'13Id. at 201, 214.
I' Id. at 193. The Hochfelder case grew out of a fraudulent scheme by Leston Nay,

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

requirement for Rule 10b-5 liability as "scienter,"'' but specifically reserved the question whether recklessness, which has been recognized as4 a3
42
form of intentional behavior,' would support Rule 10b-5 civil liability.
Further, because Hochfelder was a private action for compensatory damages, the decision left open the issue whether the SEC would be required
a prerequisite to issuance of an injunction in its ento prove scienter as
144
actions.
forcement
SEC Enforcement Actions
Courts during the last year have reached conflicting results on whether
45
proof of scienter is a prerequisite for SEC injunctive relief. In SEC v.
president and majority stockholder of First Securities Company, a small brokerage firm.
Ernst & Ernst performed periodic audits of First Securities. The audits failed to reveal the
existence of a "mail rule" whereby Nay's mail could not be opened in his absence. This "mail
rule" allowed Nay to maintain a fraudulent scheme whereby he induced respondents to invest
in escrow accounts, which supposedly yielded high rates of return, when actually no such
accounts existed and Nay was simply converting the money to his own use. The gravaman of
the complaint was that Ernst & Ernst had aided and abetted Nay's violation of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 by negligently failing to detect or report the irregular mail rule. Id. at 18890.

9 425 U.S. at 193. The Hochfelder court, for purposes of the opinion, defined scienter
as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12.
"2 See Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 448-49 (1931);
W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 34 at 184-85 (4th ed. 1971); text accompanying
notes 168-93 infra.
"

425 U.S. at 194 n.12.

The Hochfelder Court framed the issue of the case as "whether a private cause of
action for damages" would lie in the absence of any allegation of scienter. Id. at 193 (emphasis
added). The Court made it clear that a determination of the role of scienter in a section 10(b)
action for damages was not determinative of the issue whether scienter is a necessary element
in an action for injunctive relief. Id. at 194 n.12. SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180
(1963), illustrates that a decision requiring a showing of scienter in an action for damages
may not be determinative of the need to show scienter in injunctive actons. Capital Gains
involved an injunctive action against a broker based on the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80b-21 (1970), an Act with a fundamental purpose of full disclosure
similar to the '33 and '34 Act. 375 U.S. at 186; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1970). Interpreting the
words "fraud" and "deceit" as they appeared in the Advisors Act, the Court concluded that
in the context of injunctive relief proof of intent to injure was not required and that to require
proof of intent would frustrate the remedial purpose of the Act. 375"U.S. at 186-95.
SEC injunctive relief can be likened to certain equitable remedies available at common
law. To obtain rescission for misrepresentation, only a showing of the materiality of the
misrepresentation and reliance by the plaintiff was required. See Canadian Agency, Ltd. v.
Assets Realization Co., 165 App. Div. 96, 150 N.Y.S. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1914). One commentator
suggests that if SEC injunctive relief is analogized to common law equitable rescission an
argument can be made that neither scienter nor specific intent should be a prerequisite to
SEC injunctive relief. See Maher & Blasi, Lessons From Ernst & Ernst-EnforcementProceedings and the Uncommon Law of 10b-5, 82 DICK L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Maher & Blasi].
I' Prior to the Hochfelder decision courts had generally held that a showing of negligence
was sufficient to support an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515
F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d
IU
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American Realty Trust,' a Virginia federal district court found that the
defendants had omitted material information from a prospectus filed in
conjunction with the sale of debentures,'47 but refused to hold that they
had violated section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because the SEC had failed to
prove that the defendants acted with intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud.' The court found persuasive the fact that the Supreme Court
derived the scienter requirement from the language and legislative history
of section 10(b).1 9 The court reasoned that since the requirement of scienter derived from the wording of the statute, it was necessarily an element
of all actions under that statute.15 The court noted that while SEC injunc1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966); SEC
v. M. A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226, 234 (D.R.I. 1973). But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
Since Hochfelder, courts have been sharply split on the issue whether scienter must be
proved in Rule 10b-5 injunctive actions. The first two courts considering this question reached
directly opposite results. In SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976)
the First Circuit held that because SEC injunctions are designed to protect the public
against injurious violations that courts find are likely to persist, the state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant. The World Radio court therefore limited Hochfelder to the proposition
that good faith is a defense to a private suit for past misrepresentations. Id. at 540. See
generally 1976-1977Developments, supra note 5, at 913-18.
In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), a district court faced the same issue and concluded that
Hochfelder mandated a finding of scienter as a condition of liability in all actions based on
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court reasoned that since the Hochfelder Court rested its
decision on the language and history of section 10(b), and since both injunctive and private
actions are derived from that statute, there should be no distinction in requirements between
private and injunctive actions. Id. at 1240-41. See also, 425 U.S. at 217-18 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The court indicated that although private and SEC injunctive actions had traditionally been distinguished on policy grounds, since the history and language of section 10(b)
was dispositive of the standard for liability, discussion of policy considerations was unwarranted. 420 F. Supp. at 1241, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision but did not consider the validity of the
lower courts holding that Hochfelderrequired a showing of scienter in SEC injunctive actions.
565 F.2d 8, 14 (1977).
"' 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977).
", The defendants distributed a prospectus as part of an offering and sale of $3.4 million
dollars of debentures. The SEC alleged that American Realty Trust failed to disclose properly
five material business transactions. Id. at 1153. The court found no material misrepresentation had been made about four of the transactions, but that an omission concerning the
circumstances surrounding one loan was material. Id. at 1170.
10 Id. at 1170-71. The American Realty court reasoned that since the Hochfelder Court
derived the requirement of scienter from the wording of section 10(b) that SEC injunctive
suits and private actions for damages, being based on the same statute, both require a
showing of scienter. Id. at 1171.
" 429 F. Supp. at 1171. The court cited the Hochfelder dissent's contention that the
majority's analysis of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 eliminated any appropriate basis for
distinguishing between standards to be applied in private actions and SEC injunctive actions.
Id. at 1171 n.4, citing, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 217-18 (Blackman, J.,
dissenting).
110Id. at 1171; see note 8 supra.
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tive actions and private damage actions under section 10(b) could be distinguished on the ground that differing policy considerations underlie
each, 5 ' examination of these considerations was precluded by the force of
1
the statutory language.

2

The Hochfelder decision was similarly construed in SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co.' 53 There, a Louisiana federal district court found that
the defendants had omitted material information from offering circulars
distributed pursuant to their business of selling undivided interests in oil
and gas leases. 54 The court, however, held that the omissions did not
constitute a violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because the Commission had failed to establish that the defendants either intended to deceive
or defraud, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 5 Noting the
division of authority over whether Hochfelder requires proof of scienter in
SEC enforcement actions,'56 the court relied on the analysis of American
Realty Trust. The court reasoned that if the language of section 10(b)
mandated a finding of scienter to establish a Rule 10b-5 violation in private actions, the SEC, acting under the same statutory authority, would
be similarly bound by the statutory limits of that section. 57
"1429 F. Supp. at 1171. Judge Friendly, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring) while considering the propriety of issuing
an injunction, noted a policy consideration which would support application of different
culpability standards for private damage actions and SEC injunctive actions. He argued that
to have less than a scienter standard for private Rule 10b-5 actions would put tremendous
burdens on those issuing corporate news releases and work directly counter to the trend
toward immediate disclosure to the investing public of important business and financial
developments. Id. at 866-67. Judge Friendly reasoned, however, that one of the most important purposes of the securities acts was to eliminate disclosure of misleading information and,
therefore, the SEC should be able to protect the public by obtaining injunctions without being
required to show scienter. Id. at 868.
152 429 F. Supp. at 1171.
'
439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977).
154 Defendants Cash, Heflin and Parsons incorporated Southwest Coal and Energy to sell
oil and gas leases for exploration. Oil and gas leases are securities as defined by § 2(1) of '33
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1970). They also owned large interests in many other corporations,
organized and acting for the same purpose as Southwest. The other corporations were developing wells on land contiguous to Southwest's holdings. The major misrepresentations were
in maps of the available lease areas that were distributed as circulars which showed other
development in adjacent areas without properly revealing the affiliation between Southwest
and these other corporations. Consequently, the maps gave the impression that several other
companies had investigated the area and decided to drill in the area. 439 F. Supp. at 824.
25 Cash and Heflin were not directly involved with the sales of the leases; rather, they
were in charge of the drilling operation. The court found no evidence indicating that Cash
and Heflin intended to deceive, or that their delegating supervision of the sales operation to
Parsons constituted reckless disregard of the truth, in that there was no indication that they
were aware that Parson's inability and lack of knowledge of the field would result in material
misrepresentations or omissions. Id. at 824.
25 Id. at 825.
's The court did find, however, that § 17(a)(2) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a)(2)(1970), which prohibits omissions and misrepresentations of material facts in
connection with a public offering of securities did not require a showing of scienter as a
prerequisite to establishing a violation. 439 F. Supp. at 826-27. Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §
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77q(a), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under
which they~were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
The language of § 17(a) and Rule lOb-5 are very similar and their respective applicability
differs only in that the prohibitions of § 17(a) are limited to public offerings of securities while
Rule lOb-5 is applicable to all sales and purchases of securities. Because of the similarity
between these provisions the SEC and plaintiff purchasers have begun to advance their
claims against sellers under § 17(a) as well as Rule 10b-5 when both are applicable. These
attempts to circumvent Hochfelder raise the issue whether scienter must be shown to establish a violation of § 17(a). Courts have differed on the answer to this question. The Southwest
Coal court employed a four step analysis concluding that a violation of § 17(a)(2) requires
no showing of scienter. First, the court rejected the conclusion that the similarity between
the language of §17(a) and that of Rule lob-5 mandated a finding that scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 17(a). The Southwest Coal court reasoned that the Hochfelder
analysis called for examination of each section of the '33 and '34 Act independently to
determine the appropriate standard of culpability. The court stated that "[tihe standard of
care under § 17(a) must be determined by reference to § 17(a), not to § 10(b) of the 1934
Act." 439 F. Supp. at 826.
Rejecting the similarity in language between § 17(a) and Rule lob-5 as a basis of decision
is well founded. The Hochfelder Court found that the requirement of scienter in Rule 10b-5
actions derived not from the Rule itself but from the language of its enabling statute, section
10(b). Therefore Hochfelder does not compel a finding that the language of Rule 10b-5 or
language similar to it requires a showing of scienter. Id. at 826.
Analyzing the language of § 17(a) the Southwest Coal court next reasoned that since §
17a(1) clearly required a showing of scienter, § 17a(2) could not logically require scienter. If
both sections required scienter all violations of § 17a(2) would also be violations of § 17a(1)
and thus § 17a(2) would be superfluous, a result the court felt Congress could not have
intended. Id. Accord Maher & Blasi, supra note 144 at 14-16, 25-26.
Third, the court likened the language of § 17a(2) to that of § 11 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(1970), which creates an absolute liability for material misstatements or omissions in a
registration statement. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 0; Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Since the operative language of the
two sections is nearly identical the court reasoned that, as with 11, § 17a(2) does not require
a showing of scienter. 439. F. Supp. at 826.
Finally Southwest distinguished the purposes of the '33 and '34 Acts. While the '33 Act
was intended to promote disclosure, the '34 Act was largely an antifraud measure and it is
thus entirely consistent with the purposes of the '34 Act that § 10b would place emphasis on
the state of mind of a defendant while § 17a(2) would have no such restriction. Id.
Other courts analyzing § 17(a) have reached contradictory conclusions. Compare Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977) (scienter necessary element of § 17(a)
violation) with SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (scienter not necessary
for injunctive relief under § 10(b) or § 17(a)). See generallyMahler & Blasi, supra note 144,
at 14-16 (concluding a showing of negligence sufficient for action based on § 17a(2)).
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In contrast, a Florida federal district court, in SEC v. Shiell,5 rejected
the reasoning of American Realty Trust and held that Hochfelder did not
require the SEC to allege scienter in an injunctive action under Rule 10b5.19 Resting its decision on policy grounds, the court reasoned that injunctive relief is intended to protect the public against injurious conduct. Consequently, to require the SEC to prove intentional fraud might seriously
impair the Commission's ability to police securities transactions and,
therefore, reduce the Commission's ability to protect the public."'0 The
Shiell court did not attempt to reconcile the Hochfelder Court's reading
of the language of section 10(b) '' with their own policy analysis. The Shiell
court relied instead on pre-Hochfelder decisions requiring a showing of
scienter in private actions for damages, but advocating issuance of injunctions in enforcement actions without regard to the defendant's state of
mind.'62 Recognizing the uncertainty of the law in this area, the court
qualified its decision stating that even if scienter must be alleged, their
decision would stand because the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to allege recklessness, which the court recognized as satisfying the
scienter requirement.'
While the Shiell court did not consider the Hochfelder Court's statutory
construction of section 10(b), it reached the better result. The Hochfelder
decision should not be read to require a showing of scienter in SEC enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5.1 4 First, the Hochfelder Court was careful
to limit its decision to private damage actions. This indicates that the
Court either did not consider the question of what standard of culpability
should apply in enforcement actions or did not intend Hochfelder to resolve the issue.'65 Second, it is generally unnecessary to establish all ele158[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla. Sept 27,
1977).
,",
SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 at 92,386.
The issue of the need to show scienter in injunctive actions arose on a motion for summary
judgment. The defendant asserted that it was entitled to a judgment on the ground that the
SEC had failed to make an adequate allegation of scienter. Id. at 92,385-86. For a discussion
of the complaint filed in the Shiell case see Cohen, The Outside Director-Selection,Responsibilities, And ContributionTo The Public Corporation,34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 837, 843-47
(1977).
"I0Id. at 92,386. The Shiell court also noted that the Second Circuit, which had correctly
anticipated Hochfelder by requiring a showing of scienter in private actions, had always
distinguished enforcement actions, requiring only a showing of negligence. Id. at 92,386 n.2.
"I See note 145 supra for a discussion of the Bausch & Lomb analysis of the Hochfelder
decision.
5' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH)
96,190 at 92,386 n.2.
163 Id.

,',
See, e.g., Maher & Blasi, supra note 144; Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin
Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Scienter Question, 5 HoFsTRa L. REv. 831
(1977). But see Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A ReappraisalIn Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y. U.L. REV. 769 (1976);
Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: An Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y. L. SCHOOL
L. REv. 29 (1976).
', The Hochfelder decision considered only the role of scienter in private actions for
damages. While the scope was limited, the Court rested its decision on an-analysis of the
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ments of a suit for monetary damages in a suit for prophylactic relief.11 A
lighter burden in enforcement actions would allow more effective fulfillment of the investor protection policy which underlies the Securities
Acts.' 7 Decisions like American Realty Trust, requiring the SEC to show
intentional conduct, might seriously hinder the Commission in its efforts
to protect the investing public.
Recklessness
While the Hochfelder Court held that scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud-was a necessary element of Rule 10b-5 liability,"8 the
Court did not address the question whether a showing of reckless behavior
would be sufficient to sustain civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.'" Since Hochfelder, courts have uniformly held that reckless conduct constitutes scienter and is sufficient to support Rule 10b-5 liability."'
statutory language of Section 10(b). Because the Court derived the scienter requirement
from the language of Section 10(b) it is difficult to argue that the same statute does not mandate a showing of scienter when the SEC is seeking an injunction. The language argument is
especially compelling since section 10(b) makes no mention of a private right of action. Thus,
Congress must have contemplated that the language of the statute should be a guide to the
SEC in enforcing the proscriptions of the Act. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The Hochfelder decision was another of a series of decisions aimed at limiting the class
of plaintiffs able to sue under the securities laws. See generally Note, JudicialRetrenchment
Under Rule 10b-5: An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DuKE L. J. 789. Fear of extending the
"frontiers" of the hazards of rendering expert advice was clearly a factor in the Courts
decision to require a showing of more than negligence in damage actions. See 425 U.S. at 21415 n.33. If one of the major aims of the Hochfelder decision was to limit the class of plaintiffs
able to sue and protect professionals involved in the securities field from realizing tremendous
liability for negligent errors, the decision should not be construed as placing a greater burden on the SEC whose only function is to act in the public interest.
"I See SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967). In SEC v. CapitalGains Bureau the Court,
construing the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-80b-21 (1976), drew a
sharp distinction between private damage suits and SEC actions for prophylactic relief. The
Court reasoned that at common law it was not necessary in an action for prophylactic or
equitable relief to establish all elements required in a suit for monetary damages. The Court
concluded that the SEC could obtain an injunction without proving intent to injure or actual
injury. 375 U.S. at 192-93.
" The role of the SEC as a litigant for injunctive relief is to protect the public interest.
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975). Investors may be injured by negligent
deception as well as by wilful deception. Therefore, the functions and purposes of the SEC
should allow it to enjoin negligent action within the bounds of Rule 10b-5.
IB 425 U.S. at 193.
'' Id. at 194 n.12.
110See Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033
(7th Cir. 1977); Herzfeld v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,253 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 1977); Continental Assurance Co. v. American
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This result accords with common law precepts that liability for fraud or
deceit can be based on a showing of either willful misrepresentation or
misrepresentation made with reckless disregard for the truth.' Because it
appears settled that defendants are liable under Rule 10b-5 for reckless
conduct, the principal issue to be resolved is the proper standard for defining "recklessness." The resolution of this question will largely determine
the true importance of Hochfelder. If courts define recklessness as a form
of behavior closer to negligence than to intentional fraud the impact of the
2
Hochfelder scienter requirement will be greatly reduced.
In the last year, the Seventh Circuit recognized recklessness as a form
of scienter and developed a definition of recklessness against which a defendant's behavior may be tested.7 3 In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp.,'74 the court adopted and analyzed a two part test of recklessness.
The case grew out of Sundstrand Corp's attempt to merge with a company
called SKI. The defendant Meers, an outside director of SKI and a former
investment counselor for Sundstrand, acted as intermediary for the purchase of SKI stock.'75 Of key importance to Sundstrand were SKI's projected earnings. During the merger negotiations one SKI director and a
private auditing firm indicated to Meers that SKI's accounting procedures
might be faulty and therefore misleading as to projected earnings for the
year.' 6 The merger subsequently fell through after Sundstrand had purBankshares Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,274 (E.D. Wis.
Nov. 7, 1977); Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 235 (1977).
In adopting recklessness as a form of scienter courts have relied primarily on analogy to
the common law where reckless behavior was sufficient to support causes of action sounding
in fraud or deceit. Courts have professed doubt that the Hochfelder Court intended Rule 10b5 to be construed more narrowly than its common law analogs. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-81 (D. Del. 1976). See generally Haimoff, Holmes Looks at
Hochfelder and lob-5, 32 Bus. LAw. 147 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Haimoff].
'" See Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, 374; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTS 699-714 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
"7I The certainty engendered by the relative clarity of the scienter standard of culpability
may disappear as a result of inconsistent interpretations of recklessness. Thus, a court,
desiring to hold a particular defendant liable, need only label his neglect as reckless.
Fleischer, Marsh & Anderson, The Impact of Recent Supreme CourtDecisions: Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder And TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., in P.L.I., EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTrTUTE
ON SECUmTIES REGULATION (Fleisher, Mundheim, & Vandegrift eds.) 309, 317-20.
" See note 170 supra.
174 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
I75Id. at 1038. The stock purchased by Sundstrand was owned by the Burke family,
founders of SKI, and Mr. Huarisa, then chairman of the board and president of SKI. Mr.
Huarisa owned 172,000 shares and had a right to first refusal on 233,190 shares and had a
right to first refusal on 223,190 shares held by the Burke family. Id. at 1037. Huarisa was also
a defendant in the instant case and was found liable for reckless misrepresentations. Id. at
1039-40.
"I'Id. at 1041. Burke, a director of SKI, filed a report questioning the accounting practices of SKI, centering on SKI's continuing deferral of certain preproduction costs. Burke also
filed a supporting report from the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst. The questionable accounting practices were discussed at 25 board meetings in 1968. Due to Burke's complaints
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chased a large block of SKI stock. When it became apparent that SKI's
earnings would not approach those projected, Sundstrand sued Meers. 11"
The court found that Meers had a quasi-fiduciary duty of disclosure to
Sundstrand 8 and had recklessly failed to disclose the accounting reports
that raised doubts about SKI's earning projections."'
In finding Meers' conduct was reckless as a matter of law the court
adopted the definition of recklessness first stated in Franke v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Development Authority:10
reckless conduct ma be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.
The court divided the Franke definition into a two part test consisting of
an objective and subjective element. Under the objective element of the
test, the danger of misleading purchasers must either be known to or so
obvious that any reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing.'
Under this test the court reasoned that even if Meers had no actual knowledge of the danger of misleading Sundstrand by failing to inform it of SKI's
questionable accounting practices he would be bound as knowing because
the repeated and vehement discussion of the matter at board meetings
would have made the danger clear to any reasonable man.
To fulfill the second part of the Frankerecklessness test, the subjective
element, an omission must derive from something more extraordinary than
inexcusable neglect. Under this rationale had Meers simply forgotten to
reveal the information the subjective element of the recklessness test
would not have been fulfilled, thereby precluding a finding of liability. 2
SKI consulted the SEC about the problem. The SEC concluded that the 1967 report was not
improper. After meeting with the SEC, SKI's accounting firm assured the SEC that it would
re-evaluate the situation when the 1968 report was prepared. Id.
I" During the merger negotiations, in December of 1968, and before SKI annual report
had been filed, Sundstrand was assured that SKI's earnings would be about $1.16 per share.
After SKI's accountants decided they could no longer defer preproduction costs but had to
write them off, see note 39 supra, they calculated that SKI would lose 15 cents per share for
1968. 553 F.2d at 1041.
"I Meers had performed investment banking services for Sundstrand and Sundstrand
officers had confidence in him. From this relationship the court found Meers to be a quasifiduciary and thus under a common law duty to disclose material facts pertinent to the
merger. 553 F.2d at 1043; see PRossER, supra note 171, at 697; Haimoff, supra note 170, at
164-66.
"7'Id. at 1047.

428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Old. 1976).
The Sundstrand court noted that the objective test must be administered by viewing
the facts in "their contemporaneous configuration rather than in the blazing light of hindsight." 553 F.2d at 1045, n.19.
I" According to the Sundstrand court, Hochfelder required a subjective test with a
requirement of something more than "inexcusable negligence." Id. at 1045 n.20; see Ernst &
"

"'
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In applying the subjective element the court found that Meers must have
consciously decided not to disclose the difficulty in the accounting procedures. * ' Thus, having fulfilled both elements of the two part test, consciously failing to reveal an objectively obvious and important material
fact, omission of which presents great danger of misleading the purchaser,
84
Meers was found reckless as a matter of law.
The Seventh Circuit again applied the Franke definition of recklessness, reaching a different result, in Sanders v. JohnNuveen & Co.5 5 In that
case the question was whether an "underwriter of short term commercial
paper who acted in the mistaken but honest belief that financial statements prepared by certified public accountants correctly represented the
condition of the issuer was liable to its customers for losses sustained as a
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 190 n.5. The effect of the subjective test, the court reasoned,
would be to absolve a defendant from liability if he forgot to disclose information or if it never
came to his mind. 553 F.2d 1045 n.20 & 1047. This part of the test assures that only misconduct which is close to intentional misconduct will be held to be reckless. Under this test only
a conscious decision not to reveal facts will be held reckless while neglectful omissions will
not result in liability. See Haimoff, supra note 170, at 150-54.
in 553 F.2d at 1047-48.
'
Id. at 1048. The Seventh Circuit also applied the Franke definition of recklessness in
Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), finding that the fiduciary defendant
had violated Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs, shareholders of IDC Corp., through a stockholders derivative action, accused defendant Heizer Corp. of defrauding IDC in a series of five transactions.
Heizer Corp. began its relationship with IDC by financing the corporation. In return for its
loans Heizer received rights to convert outstanding loans into common IDC stock. After
consummation of the third loan Heizer controlled or had the right to control through exercise
of its options, 61% of IDC's equity and had two representatives on the board of directors. Id.
at 243. When Heizer entered into the fourth and fifth loan transactions it required that if the
loans were not repaid on time the outstanding debts would become convertible to common
stock at $1 per share. Id. at 243 n.7. In order to increase the outstanding stock to cover this
contingency the charter had to be amended, a procedure requiring stockholder approval. In
obtaining the written consent from the majority of IDC stockholders Heizer failed to disclose
the numerous detrimental implications such a transaction could have on the stockholder's
position in IDC. Id. at 247. Noting that Heizer was a fiduciary during the fourth and fifth
transactions and had a duty to make fair and full disclosure to the shareholders, the court
found that the disclosures made in obtaining the consents for the charter amendment were
inadequate. Id. at 249. In finding Heizer's failure to inform the stockholders of the specific
terms of the fourth and fifth transactions a reckless omission within the Franke definition,
the court relied on the fact that Heizer was well aware of the controversial nature of the
transactions in that one major stockholders had already objected to the fairness of the deal.
Id. at 252. The court reasoned that due to the controversial nature of the transaction, Heizer
must have been aware or any reasonable person would have been aware of the high probability
of misleading the stockholders by failing to disclose the exact erms of the transaction. Id. The
court also found that Heizer fulfilled the subjective portion of the Franke test because Heizer
was conscious of the fact that full disclosure would not be made. Id. at 253.
In both Sundstrandand Heizer the courts imposed an affirmative duty on the defendants
to make a full and fair disclosure because of their fiduciary positions. See Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 248; Sundstrand v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043. Implication
of a duty of disclosure when a special quasi-fiduciary or fiduciary relationship exists between
transacting parties is well supported in the common law. See PROSSMR, supra note 171, at 697:
Haimoff, supra note 170, at 164-66.
1- 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).

19781

SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

result of the issuer's default."'' Evidence at trial revealed that the issuer
of the commercial paper, in collusion with its auditing firm, had fraudently
concealed its insolvent condition from the public.' The court found that
Nuveen had breached its duty to its customers by failing to investigate the
issuer or its auditing firm. In holding that Nuveen's breach was not reckless the court reasoned that its failure to investigate, which led to the
omission, was not highly unreasonable because the danger of misleading
customers by failing to investigate was neither known to the defendant nor
so obvious that knowledge of the danger should be imputed.,, Thus, the
court's holding that Nuveen was not reckless was based on a finding that
Nuveen's conduct did not fulfill the objective element of the Franke test.
The danger of misleading buyers by failing to investigate the issuer was
not so obvious and important that a reasonable man would have known of
its significance. 9
The Seventh Circuit's acceptance of recklessness as a form of scienter
sufficient to support Rule 10b-5. liability is in accord with post-Hochfelder
decisions,"' and is well-supported by policy and common law analogy. The
common law treated recklessness as a form of intentional behavior. 9' Continuation of this common law rule in 10b-5 cases will discourage reckless
conduct, protect investors, and eliminate the possibility that professionals
involved in securities transactions will incur tremendous liability for careless or inadvertent errors.
The Franke definition of recklessness as applied in Sanders and Sundstrand is well suited to distinguish conduct which is so highly unreasonable as to be a form of intentional behavior from that conduct which conceptually is closer to negligence. In Sundstrand the defendant neglected
fiduciary duties'92 to disclose relatively obvious and important information
and stood to benefit personally from the transaction. 3 By comparison, in
I" Id. at 792. This decision represented the Seventh Circuit's third consideration of the
Sanders case. The Court had already held John Nuveen Company liable in Sanders I, 524
F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975). The United States Supreme Court vacated that order and remanded the case for consideration in light of Hochfelder. John Nuveen Co. v. Sanders, 425
U.S. 929 (1976).
I" The issuer, Winter & Hirsch, Inc., a finance company, was in collusion with its
accounting firm Leiber, Bleiweis & Company. When a new accounting firm was employed to
audit the issuer it was discovered that no federal income tax return had been filed for the
previous year, that there was a $14,000,000 deficiency in accounts receivable and unrecorded
indebtedness of $1,750,000. This fraud had been perpetrated over the course of ten years.
Sanders II, 524 F.2d 1064, 1066-68 (7th Cir. 1975).
29

554 F.2d 790, 793.

Cf. Bucklo, Scienter And Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rv. 562, 567-71 (1973). In the
context of material misrepresentations scienter should be interpreted to mean either actual
or constructive knowledge of the facts. Id. at 569. Constructive knowledge should be found
when a defendant's lack of knowledge results from conduct sufficiently unreasonable that
knowledge will be attributed. Id. at 570.
"'

290

See note 170 supra.

'

See PRossER, note 171 supra, at 697 & 700-704.

2

See note 176 supra.

9

In Sundstrand Meers was to receive a $150,000 fee as broker if the transaction was
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Sanders, the defendant simply failed to investigate thoroughly enough to
discover fraudulent activities that had already been successfully concealed
for ten years. The fraudulent activities were not known or obvious to anyone nor was there ever a conscious decision not to reveal them. Thus the
Franke two part test would impose liability for omissions and misrepresentations only where the danger of misleading others would be obvious to a
reasonable man and the defendant's omission or misrepresentation is not
accidental.

C. Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care
While private actions under Rule 10b-5 are concerned primarily with a
defendant's conduct in a securities transaction, "4 courts require that a
plaintiff, in order to recover, act with reasonable care to protect himself.
Courts have adopted four different approaches in imposing this duty of due
care on a plaintiff. Some courts require a plaintiff to show affirmatively
that his reliance on the misrepresentations of the defendant was reasonable
or justifiable.'95 The second approach incorporates the plaintiff's duty of
consummated. 553 F.2d at 1043. In Heizer, had IDC been unable to repay the loans, Heizer
Corp. would have become entitled to 87% of the equity in the corporation. 560 F.2d at 244.
"' To establish liability in a private action under Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant made a material omission or misrepresentation, e.g., Schlick v. PennDixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), and that
the statement or omission was made with intent to defraud or with reckless disregard for the
truth. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In the case of misrepresentation the
plaintiff must show that he actually relied on the statement of the defendant, e.g., Titan
Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975), while in cases
involving omissions, once the omission is shown to be material, reliance is presumed. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Additionally, many courts have
imposed a duty of care on the plaintiff, which, if breached, bars the plaintiff from recovery.
E.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977); Straub v.
Viasman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
"I See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970). This case was based on alleged misrepresentations. The court reasoned that in
order for a misrepresentation or omission to fall within the prohibitions of section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 it must be made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Id. at 229.
In order to satisfy the causation requirement, a misrepresentation must be one on which a
reasonable investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation and in
the exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely. Id. at 230. The court stated the
test of causation for cases involving omissions as whether a reasonable investor, in light of
the facts existing at the time of the omission and in the exercise of due care, would have been
entitled to obtain full disclosure from the defendant and would have acted differently had
the omission not occurred. Id. Under the Vanderboom analysis if a reasonable investor, with
the knowledge of and in the circumstances of the plaintiff, would not have been entitled to
rely on the defendant's misrepresentation by virtue of his ability to readily ascertain the
truth, the misrepresentation would not be covered by section 10(b) even though the plaintiff
might have actually relied on the misrepresentation. Id. at 230-31; see Wheeler, Plaintiff's
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due care into the definition of the scope of the defendant's Rule 10b-5 duty
of disclosure.'96 Thus, the defendant's duty to disclose will vary with plaintiff experience, knowledge and ability to protect himself. A third approach
requires the plaintiff to show affirmatively, as a element of his prima facie
case, that he acted with due care."' Finally, a fourth approach requires the
defendant to raise the issue of the plaintiff's due diligence as an affirmative
defense."' While each of these approaches is aimed at encouraging investor
care in the securities market, disagreement over the better analysis continues.
Until recently, negligent conduct on the part of the plaintiff constituted
a breach of his duty of due care and generally barred his recovery."' Because of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelderns that a plaintiff must show that a defendant's misleading
conduct was either intentional or in reckless disregard of the truth,211seriDuty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.
L. REv. 561, 570-71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
The effect of this approach is to make the existence of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
violation dependent on the relative business sophistication, acumen, or access to facts of the
particular plaintiff. 422 F.2d at 230 n.10. The Vanderboom approach also imposes on the
plaintiff a duty to investigate in order to ascertain the truth. See Wheeler, supranote 195, at
571.
IsSee White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Aber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d
414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). In Essex Wire Corp., sellers of stock in a
closely held corporation alleged that the purchaser of the stock, who was the president of the
corporation, had failed to disclose the book value of the stock. The court held that the
president had no affirmative duty to disclose or direct the seller's attention to readily available information which is not of an extraordinary nature. Id. at 420. The language of the court
limited the defendant's duty to disclose where the investor had access to facts and made no
inquiry. Id. By implication, the court's analysis leads to the conclusion that the defendant
would have had a duty to disclose the information in question to plaintiffs who did not have
ready access to the information. See Id. at 420-21. Thus, the variable duty of disclosure
approach, like the justifiable reliance approach, see note 195 supra, premises the existence
of a Rule 10b-5 violation on the position and status of the plaintiff.
I"See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970). In Dupuy the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its adherence
to the McAlpine approach. 551 F.2d at 1016. The McAlpine approach as adopted by the
Dupuy court does not specifically label the plaintiff's duty of due care as an affirmative
defense. Thus, it appears that in the Fifth Circuit, after Dupuy, the plaintiff must bear the
burdens of production and proof in showing his own behavior was not reckless. But see
Wheeler, supra note 195, at 590 (suggesting McAlpine adopts due care as an affirmative
defense).
I'sSee Straub v. Viasman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976).
"I See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff
denied recovery for failure to investigate series of bounced checks in scheme where investors
intentionally defrauded plaintiff); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.
1970) (purchasers of corporation denied recovery where seller intentionally made misleading
statements but plaintiffs had failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain concealed
and misrepresented information).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
"I The Hochfelder Court specifically held that Rule 10b-5 liability must be founded on
an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Id. at 214. While the Court ruled
out negligence as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability, it expressly reserved the question whether
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ous objections have been raised concerning whether the due care requirement is equitable. 02 The objections are founded on the apparent unfairness
of requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's misconduct was intentional, but foreclosing the plaintiff from recovery if he acted negligently.
The countervailing policy supporting the apparent inequity is encouragement of investor care and self-protection in the securities market.
Recently, in Dupuy v. Dupuy,2°3 the Fifth Circuit evaluated the state

of the law concerning a plaintiffs duty of due care. The court carefully
analyzed the various approaches courts have adopted to impose a duty of
due care on the plaintiff.204 The court also evaluated the policy of barring
negligent plaintiffs from recovery when they had been intentionally or
2
recklessly defrauded.

1

Dupuy involved a suit between two brothers who had been business
partners in a number of ventures.20 The case arose as a result of a transaction whereby Clarence Dupuy purchased Milton Depuy's half interest in
Lori Corporation. 27 The jury found that Clarence Dupuy had intentionally
misrepresented the financial prospects of Lori Corporation in order to purchase his brother's interest for a depressed price.2 0 The jury also found that
Milton Depuy, the plaintiff, had exercised due care in the sale of his
stock.200 The trial judge granted judgment n.o.v., ruling that there was no
misrepresentations or omissions made with reckless disregard of the truth would support Rule
10b-5 liability. Id. at 194 n.12. Courts that have addressed the question have uniformly held
that Rule 10b-5 liability could be founded on an allegation of recklessness. See, e.g., Wright
v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th
Cir. 1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1976);
see text accompanying notes 168-93 supra.
u See Holds*orth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 689-93 (10th Cir. 1976); Straub v. Vaisman
& Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D.
Del. 1976); Comment, Due Care: Still a Limitation on 10b-5 Recovery?, 61 MARQ. L. Rv.
122, 125 (1977).
551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
20 Id. at 1013-16.
Id. at 1017-20.
2 In 1971 the Dupuy brothers were involved in four business associations as partners or
major stockholders, mostly involving real estate. Clarence, the older of the two, generally
dominated both their personal and business relationships. Id. at 1008.
211 In 1971 the brothers formed Lori Corporation, each contributing $1,880 and receiving
47 percent of its stock. Their mother received the other 6 percent. Milton was president,
Clarence was secretary-treasurer and their mother was vice-president. The corporation acquired a long-term lease on a lot intending to build a hotel on it. Milton supervised the
venture, dealing with the architects and bankers involved in the project. In 1972, Clarence,
who controlled the check book, discontinued Milton's salary. At about the same time Milton
began to experience serious health problems. Lacking income from his business ventures and
in need of money, Milton asked Clarence to purchase his interest in Lori Corporation. Subsequently, Clarence obtained financing beginning with the hotel project but did not inform
Milton of this development, instead representing to him that the project was in financial
trouble. Finally Milton sold his stock to Clarence for $45,000. Two months earlier, after
obtaining financing, Clarence had estimated the value of his own interest in the corporation
at $493,250. 551 F.2d at 1008-11.
20 Id. at 1007.
I" Id. at 1007-08.
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evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Milton had acted
with diligence." ' The case was appealed on the issue whether Milton, who
was president of Lori Corporation, exercised due care in the transaction.
The Fifth Circuit first considered the approaches adopted by other
courts to impose a duty of due care on the plaintiffs. One approach employed by several courts has made the scope of the defendant's Rule 10b-5
duty of disclosure dependent upon the relative sophistication and knowledge of the plaintiff.211 Essentially, this approach imposes a high duty of
due care on the sophisticated investor and a lesser duty on the unsophisticated investor. This result, however, is accomplished by imposing a lesser
Rule 10b-5 duty of disclosure on defendant's dealing with sophisticated
and knowledgeable investors. Thus, under this analysis, whether a defendant has violated Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose material information
hinges on the relative sophistication of the plaintiff. 22 The Dupuy court
rejected this approach reasoning that a duty of disclosure that varied with
the sophistication of the plaintiff would engender uncertainty as to the
21
duty imposed by Rule 10b-5. 1
The second approach rejected by the Dupuy court requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that his reliance on the misrepresentations of the defendant was "justifiable. 3'24 This approach was applied in a material misrepresentation case and is based on the "in connection with the purchase or
sale" clause of Rule 10b-5. 2 1 The "in connection with" language of Rule
10b-5 requires that the plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, show that
the defendant's misrepresentations affected or caused his behavior. 261 This
210Id.

"I,
See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490
F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); note 196 supra. In White the court
applied a flexible duty approach. Under a flexible duty approach a defendant's Rule 10b-5
duty to disclose would depend on such factors as the relationship of the defendant to the
plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the
benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, and the defendant's awareness of
whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions.
495 F.2d at 735.
212Under the flexible duty analysis, if a defendant failed to disclose information which
a sophisticated plaintiff was easily able to obtain and understand, the defendant would not
have violated Rule 10b-5. Yet, if a defendant failed to disclose the same information to an
unsophisticated plaintiff unaware of its existence, there would be a violation of the Rule.
Thus, whether Rule 10b-5 is violated depends on the knowledge and status of the plaintiff.
See Wheeler, supra note 195, at 572-73.
23 551 F.2d at 1015. The court also noted that a flexible standard approach would
promote a degree of gamesmanship in securities transactions by permitting the securities
investor to vary his disclosures depending upon the sophistication of the party with whom
he is dealing. Id. Finally the court reasoned that creation of a clear and unified Rule 10b-5
standard of disclosure is clearly a desirable result benefitting both those involved in securities
transactions and courts that must administer the Rule. Id.
"I See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970); note 195 supra.
I's See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), quoted in
note 3 supra.
26 See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
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is a reliance or causation requirement. In order to establish causation the
plaintiff must also show that his reliance was reasonable or justifiable in
view of his own knowledge and information readily available to him.2 17 If

the plaintiff s reliance is not justifiable the plaintiff has, under this analysis, failed to establish the reliance required by the "in connection with"
clause of Rule 10b-5 and thus, the defendant's misrepresentations do not
fall within the statutory coverage of Rule 10b-5. 2 8 The difficulty with analyzing plaintiffs behavior in terms of reliance, as the Dupuy court perceived it, was that such an approach would lead to an unwarranted distinction between misrepresentation and omission cases. In omission cases the
plaintiff is not required to prove reliance; if a plaintiff shows a material
omission, reliance is presumed." 9 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that since
positive proof of reliance is no longer required in omission cases, courts are
precluded from determining whether a plaintiff's reliance is justifiable.
Therefore, under the justifiable reliance approach, plaintiffs in omission
cases would be relieved of the burden of showing due care. In light of the
purposes of the due care requirement in Rule 10b-5 actions, the court
reasoned that a plaintiff should be held to the same standard of conduct
regardless of whether the action was founded on a misrepresentation or an
omission.Y0 Another more compelling reason to reject the justifiable reliance approach is that it effectively conditions the existence of Rule 10b-5
violations on the knowledge and availability of facts to the plaintiff,22' a
result that creates uncertainty as to the standards imposed by Rule 10b5.
A third approach implicitly rejected by Dupuy treated the issue of the
plaintiff's duty of due care as an affirmative defense.2 2 Under this approach a plaintiff need not show due care as an element of his cause of
action and the defendant bears the burdens of production and proof in
showing the plaintiff failed to exercise the requisite due care. 21
217The justifiable reliance approach imposes an affirmative duty on the investor make a
reasonable investigation of sources and materials available. If facts in the available information wGuld have put the plaintiff on notice of the alleged misrepresentation, he will be barred
from recovery. See Wheeler, supra note 195, at 571.
2,1 See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir. 1970); note 195 supra.
29 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute
the Court specifically held that in Rule lOb-5 cases involving a failure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. The plaintiff need only show that the
undisclosed facts were material. Once materiality is shown, causation is presumed. Id. at 15054. See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584 (1975); 29 VAND. L. REv. 287 (1976).
229 551 F.2d at 1015-16.
21 See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-31 n.10 (8th Cir. 1970); note
195 supra. For example, if a defendant made a fraudulent misrepresentation as to a material
fact and the plaintiffs had ready access to the truth it would seem clear that the defendants
had violated Rule 10b-5; yet under the reasonable reliance analysis if the court found that
the plaintiff's reliance was not reasonable, the statutory causation requirement would not be
fulfilled and there would be no violation of Rule lob-5. See Wheeler, supra note 195, at 591.
22 See Straub v. Vaisman, 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
2n See 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 5, at 926-27.
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The Dupuy court chose to treat the element of the plaintiff's duty of
due care as a separate part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, thus requiring
the plaintiff to bear the burdens of production and proof on the issue
whether he acted with due care. This approach, the court reasoned, would
allow a court to assess independently the plaintiff's conduct without engendering the distinction between misrepresentation and omission cases
which characterized the justifiable reliance approach." 4 This distinction
would be avoided because the plaintiff would have to show due care regardless of whether he had to show reliance. The court also noted that an
independent assessment of the plaintiffs behavior would not create a variable standard of conduct for defendants.2 2 5 Under the Dupuy approach,
whether a defendant violated his Rule 10b-5 duty of disclosure would not
depend on the sophistication of the plaintiff. First the court would decide
whether the defendant violated Rule 10b-5, and then the court would
determine whether, because he failed to exercise due care, the plaintiff
should be barred from recovery.
The Dupuy court then reconsidered the standard of care imposed by
the plaintiff's duty of due care in light of the Hochfelder holding that a
plaintiff must show intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the
defendant. 8 Prior to Hochfelder the standard was one of reasonableness.
If a plaintiff acted negligently in a securities transaction he would be
barred from recovery. In Dupuy the Fifth Circuit rejected the negligence
standard and held that the same standard of care would be imposed on
both the plaintiff and the defendant in Rule 10b-5 cases.2 " Allowing negligent plaintiffs to recover from fraudulent defendants is in keeping with
common law tort theory. 228 Noting that common law tort theory 29 recognized that the policy of deterring intentional misconduct outweighed the
policy of deterring negligent behavior,20 the Dupuy court followed the lead
of other circuits which have reconsidered the plaintiff's duty of due care
in light of Hochfelder and lowered the standard to recklessness to discourage intentional fraud.2' Thus, under the Fifth Circuit's view of the plaintiff's duty of due care high standards of defendant conduct under Rule 10b2
5 are promoted. 2
551 F.2d at 1015-16; see note 196 supra.
551 F.2d at 1015-16.
22 Id. at 1017-20.
2 Id. at 1020.
22ASee W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108 at 716 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 540 (1938).
22 See PROSSER, supra note 228, at 709 & 716.
23 551 F.2d at 1018; see PROSSER, supra note 228, § 65 at 426, & § 108 at 717.
2' 551 F.2d at 1018-19. The Dupuy court cited two other reasons for lowering the plaintiff's standard of due care to recklessness. Id.
21 The affirmative defense approach adopted by Straub v. Vaisman, 540 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir. 1976) promotes conceptual clarity as well as the Dupuy approach. The Dupuy approach
is better reasoned because, due to the standard of care imposed on plaintiffs, it is better able
to deter fradulent behavior in securities transactions. See text accompanying note 233 infra.
211
2
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The court's decision to allow a negligent plaintiff to recover under Rule
10b-5 is also well reasoned. This holding is a strong deterrent against
intentional fraud in securities transactions because it allows private plaintiffs to continue their role in enforcing the securities laws by reducing the
number of situations where they will be barred from recovery.z3 Allowing
negligent plaintiffs to recover does not encourage investor care to the same
extent as does a rule barring negligent plaintiffs from recovery. The Dupuy
rule, however, is supported by the common law policy of placing greater
importance on deterrence of fraudulent behavior as opposed to negligent
behavior, a policy which should be implemented in the complicated securities market.

D.

Rule 10b-5 and CorporateMismanagement

In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 234 the Supreme Court restricted
the role of Rule 10b-5 in remedying corporate mismanagement by refusing
to impose a substantive federal fiduciary obligation on corporate officials,
insiders and controlling shareholders. After Santa Fe, no Rule 10b-5 action
will lie unless the conduct characterized by plaintiffs as "fraud" in connection with the purchase or sale of securities involves deception or manipulation within the meaning of section 10(b) of the '34 Act.25 With this decision, the Supreme Court continued to restrict the availability of the Rule
substantive fed10b-5 private actionz and declined to develop a body2 3of
7
eral corporation law based on existing securities laws.
In Santa Fe, the Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority
stockholders in a "going private" short form merger25 was not actionable
23 Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1968)
(nothing in antitrust laws indicates a congressional intent that plaintiff misconduct should
constitute a defense to a private antitrust action; to bar recovery for plaintiff misconduct
would undermine important function performed by private antitrust action in enforcing the
antitrust laws).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970); see note 3 supra.
, See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); note 1 supra.
21 See 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 5, at 936-37 nn. 328 & 329.
23 A "going private" transaction is one in which the controlling interest in a corporation
eliminated public ownership while continuing control of the enterprise as a closely held
corporation. See generally, Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort? 49
N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975);
Note, Going Private, $4 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). A "going private" transaction typically is
accomplished by a cash tender offer or debt security exhange offer by the corporation to the
public shareholders who did not voluntarily relinquish their shares pursuant to such offers.
Frequently, the "freeze-out" is accomplished by executing a short form merger under state
merger statutes which allow the controlling interest of a corporation to eliminate public
ownership without obtaining minority shareholder approval. See generally Greene, Corporate
Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. Rsv. 487 (1976).
The potential for unfairness in "going private" transactions utilizing a state short form
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under Rule 10b-5 absent allegations of deception, misrepresentation or
nondisclosure. 9 The Supreme Court's elimination of breach of fiduciary
merger statute provided the impetus for minority public shareholders to seek relief in private
actions under Rule 10b-5. See, O'Neal & Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying SqueezeOut or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 327 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as O'Neal & Janke]. Where the merger statute has been followed, state
remedies are limited to state court appraisal of the value of the stock, see e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623 (McKinney) [1963 & Supp.
1976-77], and injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty. See Cary, Federalismand Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). The inadequacy of state law
remedies for "squeezed" minority shareholders has been widely criticized by commentators.
See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, "SQUEM OUTS" OF MiNoRrrY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION
OF BusiNEss AssocITEs (1976); O'Neal & Janke; supra at 343-45. See generally Borden, supra;
Solomon, Going Private:Business Practices,Legal Mechanics, JudicialStandardsand Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141 (1975); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder'sAppraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964).
In Santa Fe, the defendants complied fully with the Delaware short form merger statute,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (Cum. Supp. 1976), which permits a parent company owning at
least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to buy out the minority interest without prior notice to
the shareholders or a justifiable business purpose. A subsidiary of Santa Fe owned 95% of
the capital stock of Kirby Lumber Corp., a public corporation, which was merged with a shell
corporation created by Santa Fe Industries for the sole purpose of eliminating the 5% minority
public shareholders. 430 U.S. at 465. The notification statement sent to the minority shareholders the day after consummation of the merger explained the terms of the merger and
informed the shareholders that they must exchange their shares for cash and that if dissatisfied with the exchange rate, they could seek appraisal of the value of the stock in state court.
Id. at 466.
21 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that
consummation of a short form merger which lacked a justifiable business purpose violated
Rule 10b-5 as a breach of the majority stockholder's duty of fair dealing to the minority. Green
v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'g 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The absence of misrepresentation or nondisclosure was held not fatal to the Rule 10b5 claim where the controlling shareholder paid an unfairly low price for outstanding shares,
failed to give the minority shareholders prior notice of the merger, and had no valid business
justification for the elimination of minority public shareholders. 533 F.2d at 1291. For preSanta Fe discussions on whether Rule 10b-5 should be interpreted to require fair dealing
between majority and minority shareholders, compare Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a
Business Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa
Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CAL. L. REv. 1184 (1976) (favoring adoption of business purpose test
under Rule lOb-5) with Note, Securities Acts - Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Majority
Stockholders' Eliminationof MinorityThrough Merger Without Legitimate Business Purpose
Violates Rule 10b-5 NotwithstandingFull Disclosure,89 HARv. L. REV. 1917 (1976) (business
purpose test is inappropriate and confusing under 10b-5).
In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court relied upon the congressional intent
behind the language of section 10(b) of the '34 Act and considerations of policy against
extending Rule 10b-5 into an area traditionally regulated by state corporation law. The
majority opinion emphasized that the meaning of the statutory provision must be derived
primarily from the statutory language itself. 430 U.S. at 472. The Court reasoned that the
"fraud" covered by § 10(b) is stated clearly in terms of deception and manipulation. Id. at
473. In the absence of legislative history revealing an expansive congressional intent, the plain
meaning of the statutory language controlled the Court's interpretation. Id. Thus, the Court
declined to infer that Congress meant to include breach of fiduciary duty within the fraud
covered by Rule 10b-5.
The Santa Fe Court held that there was no deception since the information statement
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duty as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability has shifted the focus of mismanagement suits to the element of deception. Reaffirmation of the deception
requirement raises two issues the resolution of which will determine the
impact of SantaFe on corporate mismanagement suits pursued under Rule
10b-5. First, can a corporation be "deceived" by its self-dealing directors,
and second, does nondisclosure of an unfair securities transaction by a selfdealing board of directors constitute "deception" sufficient to invoke Rule
10b-5. During the past year lower courts have considered these issues.
With the affirmation of the deception requirement, courts faced with
shareholder derivative actions 240 must determine the "degree to which the
knowledge of officers and directors must be attributed to the corporation,
accompanying the merger contained no "omission" or "misstatement." Id. at 474. Thus, the
Court found inapposite the array of cases relied upon by the respondent and the Second
Circuit in which breaches of fiduciary duty in violation of Rule lOb-5 included some element
of deception. Id. at 474-75 n.15. Furthermore, the Court found no manipulation. The Court
recognized that the term "manipulation" as used in § 10(b) is a term of art which refers to
practices intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity. Id. at 476.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1975). See generally A. JACOBS, supra
note 11, at §§ 138-41; BRoMBERG, supra note 107, at § 7.3. Since the conduct alleged in Santa
Fe was essentially corporate mismanagement, the unfair treatment of the minority shareholders by the fiduciary was not manipulation. 430 U.S. at 477. Finding that the conduct complained of in Santa Fe was neither deceptive nor manipulative, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff failed to properly state a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.
In addition to the statutory analysis based on the language of section 10(b), the Santa
Fe Court supported its strict interpretation of the meaning of fraud with several policy
justifications. First, the Court noted that the central purpose of the federal securities laws is
to fulfill the philosophy of full disclosure in connection with securities transactions and that
the reach of the implied private action under Rule 10b-5 should be limited to the implementation of this philosphy. 430 U.S. at 477-78. Thus, where there has been full and fair disclosure,
the ultimate fairness of a securities transaction is beyond the principal congressional purpose
of the antifraud provisions. Id. at 478. Second, the potential for broad overlap and interference with traditional state regulation of corporations militated against expanding an implied
federal right of action. The Court found that the conduct alleged in Santa Fe was indistinguishable from a wide variety of corporate self-dealing and unfairness traditionally regulated
by state corporation law. Id. Affirmation of the circuit court decision would have brought
within the purview of federal securities laws a substantial portion of state corporation law.
In the absence of a clear congressional intent to accomplish this result, the Supreme Court
refused to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts in the area of substantive corporation law.
21 Although only defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under
Rule 10b-5, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the rule protects
corporations as well as individuals who purchase or sell securities. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971). Thus a shareholder may sue derivatively
to assert the rights of a corporation that has been defrauded in connection with the purchase

or sale of securities. See generally, H.

BLOOMENTHAL,

3B

SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE

LAW § 11.20 (1974). The issue of what constitutes deception of the corporation arises in
shareholder derivative actions rather than in damage actions against the corporation. In
derivative actions, the plaintiff asserts only the rights of the corporation and, therefore, must
show that the corporation was defrauded. After Santa Fe, this burden is met only by proving
deception or manipulation. In damages actions against a corporation, such as in Santa Fe
where the plaintiff shareholders had been forced out under a short form merger statute, see
note 238 supra, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were deceived. See note 239 supra.
The issue of deception of the corporation does not arise in this situation.
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2
thereby negating the element of deception." ' I In Goldberg v. Meridor,1
the Second Circuit considered whether a corporation was deceived within
the meaning of Rule 10b-5 when the controlling shareholder influenced the
corporation to enter into a transaction that was grossly unfair to the corporation and the material facts of the transaction were either not disclosed
or misrepresented to minority shareholders. In Meridor, a minority shareholder of Universal Gas & Oil, Inc. (UGO) brought a derivative action
against the controlling parent corporation and several directors of UGO
and the parent. 2 3 The plaintiff alleged that a contract executed between
the two corporations providing for the issuance of UGO stock to the parent
and the assumption of all the parent's liabilities by UGO in exchange for
the transfer of the assets of the parent to UGO was adverse to the interests
of UGO. 44 The transaction allegedly caused the dissipation of UGO's assets since the liabilities assumed by UGO exceeded the value of the assets
received from the parent. The plaintiff argued that such self-dealing in
connection with nondisclosure and misrepresentation of the material facts
2
of the transaction violated Rule 10b-5. 4
The Second Circuit held that UGO had been "deceived" within the
meaning of Rule 10b-5 even though the terms of the stock-for-assets transaction were fully disclosed to UGO's board of directors and prior shareholder approval of the transaction was not required by state law.247 The
court held that nondisclosure of the terms of the transaction to minority
shareholders operated as a deception of the subsidiary under Rule 10b-5.14 8
The court relied on pre-Santa Fe decisions finding Rule 10b-5 liability
where dominant directors or shareholders exercising a controlling influence
211Goldberg

(1978).

v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1249

Id.

242

Id. at 211. Universal Gas & Oil Co., Inc. is a Panama corporation having its principal
place of business in New York City. Id. The defendants in the action were Maritimecor, S.A.,
also a Panama corporation and UGO's controlling parent, Maritime Fruit Carriers Co. Ltd.,
an Israel corporation and Maritimecor's controlling parent, a number of individuals who were
directors of one or more of these companies, and an investment firm and an accounting firm.
Id.
244 Under the agreement, UGO issued to its parent corporation up to 4.2 million shares
of UGO stock and assumed 42.5 million dollars in liabilities. In addition, a 7 million dollar
debt owing from the parent to UGO was apparently forgiven. Id. UGO received, in consideration, all of the parent's assets except UGO shares already held by the parent. Id. Net shareholder equity in the parent corporation was 40.4 million dollars. Id. at 212 n.1.
215 Since the shareholders' net equity in the parent was 40.4 million dollars, UGO assumed liabilities several million dollars in excess of the value of the assets transferred to it.
Id. at 212 n.1.
21 The parent publicly issued two press releases which described the agreement and
consummation or the transaction, but allegedly failed to disclose the facts of the transaction
and the conflict of interest of the principals. Id. at 212. Further, the press releases allegedly
misrepresented the actual effect of the transaction, which was the dissipation of UGO's
assets, by describing UGO as replacing the parent as the principal operating subsidiary of
Maritime Fruit Company. Id.
287 567 F.2d at 211-12.
211 Id. at 218.
20
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over a corporation caused the corporation to engage in a securities transaction adverse to its interest.'" The Second Circuit had previously applied
this "controlling influence plus unfairness" doctrine as a means of establishing fraud in Rule 10b-5 derivative actions without having to conclude
that corporations were actually deceived in some way.21 The Meridorcourt
249 See id. at 214-18.

go The "controlling influence plus unfairness" standard was first announced in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
See generally Note, The ControllingInfluence Stan lard in Rule lOb-5 CorporateMismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Controlling Influence
Standard]; Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1969) [hereinafter cited as New Fraud].The Schoenbaum
court rejected the traditional deception requirement and established "controlling influence
plus unfairness" as fraud under Rule lob-5 apart from deception or manipulation. See generally BROMBERG, supra note 107, at § 4.7 (623) (Supp. 1974); Jacobs, The Role of Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REv.
27, 57-61 (1973). Prior to Schoenbaum, in the area of corporate transactions involving conflict
situations, see BROMBERG, supra note 107, at § 4.7 (542), common law concepts of actual
deception and reliance had proved to be obstacles to establishing Rule lob-5 liability. When
the board of directors of a defrauded corporation were implicated in the fraud, deception of
the corporation was impossible since traditional theory holds that the board of directors is
the corporation, see BROMBERG, supra note 107, at § 4.7 (623), and a corporation cannot
deceive itself. See, New Fraud, supra this note, at 1104 n.10; see, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag,
339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (Rule 10b-5 inapplicable; no deception where entire board of
directors approved repurchase of corporation's own stock for excessive consideration and
improper purposes). Prior to Santa Fe, however, several courts devised legal fictions to circumvent the deception limitation. In Ruckle v. Roto Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), the
Second Circuit held that the deception of a minority of the board of directors in the issuance
of stock to several directors for inadequate consideration "deceived" the corporation. The
court rejected the notion that the directors constituted the corporation, and thus was incapable of defrauding itself. Id. at 29. Relying on Ruckle, the Seventh Circuit refused "to differentiate between situations where the directors were unanimous in wrong-doing and those where
less than all were involved." Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967). In
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), the court stated that if deception of the corporation is a requisite element of a lob-5 private action, such deception may be found by viewing
the fraud as occurring against the independent shareholders standing in place of the defrauded entity. Id. at 869.
Under the "controlling influence plus unfairness" standard, disclosure of material facts
of a transaction to the entire board of directors does not negate deception of the corporation
for the purposes of Rule 10b-5 where there is also a duty to disclose directly to the shareholders. Thus, when an entire board of directors is controlled by a self-dealing director or shareholder, or the directors have a financial interest in the transaction, the corporation can be
represented only by the independent shareholders to whom full disclosure must be made.
Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 98 S.Ct. 1243 (1978);
see Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1975);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865,
869 (3d Cir. 1968); Ruckle v. Roto Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1964). Similarly,
where shareholder approval of a transaction is required by state law, the shareholders are
deemed to represent the corporation and are entitled to disclosure of all material facts relating
to the transaction. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 247 (7th Cir. 1977); see Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 24 (7th Cir. 1972); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d
Cir. 1972). See generally Sherrard, Fiduciariesand Fairness Under Rule lOb-5, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 1385, 1427 (1976). On the other hand, where a disinterested majority of a board is fully
informed of all relevant facts pertaining to a transaction, disclosure to the board of directors

1978]

SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

recognized, however, that after Santa Fe, the "controlling influence plus
unfairness" doctrine is, alone, insufficient to form the basis of Rule 10b-5
liability absent some showing of deception or manipulation. 21 The Meridor
court ruled, however, that the deception requirement was satisfied when
the controlling corporation, which caused UGO to sell its securities to the
parent for inadequate consideration, failed to disclose the material facts
of the transaction to the UGO stockholders. 2
The court then rejected the defendant's argument that the alleged misleading disclosure was not material since the shareholders were not required to approve the transaction and the plaintiff failed to allege how he
would have acted had he known the essential facts.2 3 The Meridor court
held that in Rule 10b-5 actions, undisclosed or misleadingly disclosed facts
are material if they would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of reasonable and disinterested directors or would have created a
substantial likelihood that such directors would have considered the total
mix of information available to be significantly altered.24 Applying this
test to the facts, the court held that a reasonable director of UGO, having
knowledge of the facts alleged by the plaintiff, would not have voted for
the transaction.2 55 Moreover, the court emphasized that the minority
shareholders of UGO could have sought injunctive relief under state law
had they not been influenced by the defendants' misleadingly favorable
disclosures.ae
constitutes disclosure to the corporation. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); see Falkenberg v. Baldwin [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,086 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
21 567 F.2d at 217.
25 Id. at 218. The court stated that the Supreme Court in Santa Fe precluded only those
"controlling influence plus unfairness" actions brought under Rule 10b-5 which fail to allege
material misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Id. The Supreme Court did not overrule prior
decisions in which breaches of fiduciary duty held violative of Rule 10b-5 included some
element of deception, but merely distinguished them from cases involving allegations of
unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty which do not satisfy the deception requirement. See
430 U.S. at 474-75, n.15.
567 F.2d at 218.
"I The standard of materiality which the Meridorcourt applied to the Rule 10b-5 action
was set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
Although TCS Industries dealt with materiality under § 14(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1976), and Rule 14(a)-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977), application of this same standard under § 10(b) is correct as a matter of statutory interpretation since the statutes are in
pari materia. See 567 F.2d at 218-19; Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,327 at 93,096 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1978).
" 567 F.2d at 219.
2'
The Meridor court noted that New York state courts "display no hesitancy" in granting injunctive relief, where an appraisal remedy is not available. 567 F.2d at 219. See, e.g.,
Silverman v. Lehrman, 25 Misc. 2d 339, 203 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1960) (enjoining transaction between subsidiary and parent). Typically, statutory appraisal rights are
available to shareholders who object to merger or consolidation transactions. See N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 623 (McKinney) (1963 & Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (Cum. Supp.
1976). Since the transaction complained of in Meridor did not involve a merger or consolidation giving rise to a right to payment for shares, the UGO shareholders did not have any right
of appraisal under state law. 567 F.2d at 219.
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In applying the "controlling influence plus unfairness" doctrine to a
self-dealing transaction between a parent and subsidiary, the Meridor
court held that the deception requirement was satisfied because material
facts of the unfair transaction either were not disclosed or were misleadingly disclosed to the independent shareholders, even though disclosure
was not required by law.25 Thus, the court brought the self-dealing transaction involved in Meridor within the ambit of the Santa Fe Court's holding that fraud does not exist under Rule 10b-5 absent "deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure." ' 5
The Second Circuit's holding in Meridor reflects the willingness of
lower courts to apply Rule 10b-5 flexibly and broadly. The court's application of Rule 10b-5 would seem to reach, however, any breach of fiduciary
duty by controlling shareholders or financially interested directors who fail
to inform the stockholders of their intended mismanagement., 9 Since
those who breach their fiduciary duties rarely disclose the facts of the
unfair transaction or the conflict of interest, in the controlling influence
situation virtually any corporate mismanagement in connection with a
securities transaction will involve some nondisclosure or misrepresentation
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit's broad reading of
the deception requirement 60 may operate to circumvent the policy of the
Santa Fe Court to relegate corporate mismanagement suits to state
courts."6 '
GREGG J. BORRi
THOMAS

P. HEALY, JR.

In addition to common law injunctive relief, UGO shareholders could have sought to
enjoin the transfer of corporate assets under state statute. Id.; see N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §
720 (McKinney) (1963).
The dissenting judge in Meridor urged, however, that the nondisclosure or misleading
disclosures were not material under the TSC Industries standard. 567 F.2d at 222 (Meskill,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under Panamanian law, no shareholder action
was necessary to effect the stock-for-assets transaction. Thus, the plaintiff shareholder had
the burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood that he would have acted differently had
full disclosure been made. Id. The dissent found that the nondisclosure was not material since
the plaintiff failed to allege what course of action he would have pursued. Id. Cf. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977) (failure to give advance notice of merger
not material where plaintiffs failed to indicate how they might have acted with such notice).
21 567 F.2d at 218.
21 430 U.S. at 476.
21 567 F.2d at 225 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"4The Meridor court responded to the deception requirement announced in Santa Fe
by modifying the purpose of the "controlling influence plus unfairness" standard. Originally,
this standard developed as a means of establishing fraud under Rule 10b-5 where proof of
actual deception was difficult. Under the Meridordecision, the controlling influence doctrine
establishes deception of the corporation. See note 250 supra; 567 F.2d at 217-18.
26,See 430 U.S. at 477-80; note 239 supra. One district court after Meridorhas held that
mere failure to disclose that a transaction is unfair is insufficient to establish the element of
deception required by Santa Fe. In Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
minority shareholders brought a derivative action on behalf of a corporation on the ground
that the corporate parents had looted the corporation through a series of fraudulent securities

